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[I]f we want to know why a rule of law has taken its particular shape, and 
more or less if we want to know why it exists at all, we go to tradition. We 
follow it into the Year Books, and perhaps beyond them to the customs of the 
Salian Franks, and somewhere in the past, in the German forests, in the 
needs of Norman kings, in the assumptions of a dominant class, in the 
absence of generalized ideas, we find out the practical motive for what now 
best is justified by the mere fact of its acceptance and that men are 
accustomed to it.1 
In a system of law that adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis,2 it is 
impossible to understand the law as it is today without understanding the law 
as it has been in the past. Reliance upon binding precedents leads courts to 
begin every new case with an examination of the past. The resolutions that 
arise in turn form a foundation for future cases. The doctrine of stare decisis 
thus creates a seamless web connecting the past to the present and future. 
Legal scholars have long grappled with the role of history in the law. 
They have debated the importance of tradition in constitutional 
interpretation,3 the role of historical narrative in decision making,4 and the 
 
 1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 186 
(1920) [hereinafter HOLMES, The Path of the Law]. 
 2. The term stare decisis is derived from the phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere—”let 
the decision stand and do not disturb things which have been settled.” John Paul Stevens, The 
Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1983); see also  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1406 (6th ed. 1990) (defining stare decisis as “to abide by or adhere to decided cases”). In this 
Article, I use the term to refer to what is sometimes called as “vertical stare decisis” or the 
“doctrine of hierarchical precedent,” under which the decisions of higher courts are binding on 
lower courts. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817, 820-23 (1994) (describing and defending what Caminker terms the “doctrine 
of hierarchical precedent”); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2024-
25 (1994) (describing “vertical stare decisis”); Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: 
Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 436-37 
(1992) (describing the distinction between “horizontal” and “vertical” stare decisis). 
 3. Some recent examples of work on the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation 
include 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION : FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1977); Rebecca L. Brown, 
Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering 
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and 
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995); David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 
(1991); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1923); A.C. 
Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409 (1999). 
 4. Recent work in this vein includes 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 3; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE 
TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY (1994); ERIC FONER,  THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998); 
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); and 
ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997). 
Several scholars have focused in particular on the role of historical narrative in the courts. See, 
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value of precedent.5 A central strand of this scholarship has proposed and 
developed a theory that might be termed “legal evolution.”6 This school of 
thought—which originated in the German “historical school” of 
jurisprudence in the nineteenth century and the flurry of related 
scholarship that followed the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection7—came to the center of analysis of legal 
doctrine with the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes in the 1880s.8 Holmes’ 
work, in turn, set the stage for the law and economics school’s more recent 
“evolution-to-efficiency” model of the common law.9 
Despite the long recognition that history plays an important role in 
legal development, we still know surprisingly little about the specific ways in 
which history shapes the law. In this Article, I seek to fill this gap. I offer a set 
of analytic tools developed in the social sciences and evolutionary biology—
which I group together under the rubric of “path dependence theory”—to 
explore the influence of history in our common law system.10 In broad 
 
e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: 
JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 4 (1981) (discussing the role of narrative in 
trials); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative , 97 HARV. 
L.  REV. 4, 4-5 (1983) (“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. . . . Once understood in the context of the 
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a 
world in which we live.”); Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 863, 864 (1996) (“[N]arrative and storytelling pervade the law, from the competing 
narratives in trial court proceedings to the legal and historical narratives appearing in Supreme 
Court opinions.”). 
 5. There are two primary sets of arguments in favor of the doctrine of stare decisis: 
instrumental and intrinsic. For a description and examples of these claims, see infra notes 193-
202 and accompanying text. Other works debating the value of precedent include William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and 
Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis , 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 89 (1998); Jeffrie G. 
Murphy, Justifying Departures from Equal Treatment, 81 J. PHIL. 587 (1984); Roscoe Pound, What of 
Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941); James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in 
a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345 (1986). 
 6. For a comprehensive review of the history of the legal evolution literature, see E. 
Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM.  L.  REV. 38 (1985) 
[hereinafter Elliott, Evolutionary Tradition]. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The 
New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 595 (1997) (reviewing and critiquing a decade of 
developments in the use of biological metaphors in law); M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in Law: 
Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 31 (1993) (providing a critical review of the use of 
evolutionary theory in the law). 
 7. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (J.W. 
Burrow ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1859); see also infra text accompanying notes 136-43 
(discussing the history of evolutionary theory in legal scholarship). 
 8. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,  THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) [hereinafter 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW]. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 144-51 (discussing modern law and economics 
model of legal evolution -to-efficiency). 
 10. Here I use the term “common law system” to refer to the common law legal tradition 
that traces to the English system, as opposed to the “civil law” or “socialist law” systems that form 
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terms, “path dependence” means that an outcome or decision is shaped in 
specific and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it. It entails, in 
other words, a causal relationship between stages in a temporal sequence, 
with each stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage. At 
the most basic level, therefore, path dependence implies that “what 
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a 
sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.”11 
Path dependence, as I use the term here, is not simply a restatement of 
the evolutionary model of law or a mere claim that “history matters.” Rather, 
it consists of specific descriptions and explanations of how history influences 
the process of legal change in a common law system. In this Article, I 
identify three strands of path dependence theory, which I term “increasing 
returns path dependence,” “evolutionary path dependence,” and 
“sequencing path dependence.” I then outline the characteristics of the 
common law system that lead to each type of path dependence and explore 
the implications of each for the course and pattern of change in the 
American common law system. In short, I explain how the path of the law 
shapes the law.12 
 
the other two major legal traditions within the Western legal tradition. See MARY ANN GLENDON 
ET AL. ,  COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 14 (1985) (describing briefly the different legal 
systems). 
 11. William H. Sewell, Jr., Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology, in THE HISTORIC 
TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 262-63 (Terrence J. McDonald ed., 1996). 
 12. Of course, others have recognized the historically contingent nature of the common 
law system, and a few have even used the broad term “path dependence” to describe some 
aspects of it. See Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, 
Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. 
eds., 1993) (noting path-dependent tendencies of intellectual property institutions). See generally 
HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 1 (noting, though not in those terms, the tendency of 
the common law toward path dependence); Richard A. Posner, Path -Dependency, Pragmatism, and 
a Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2000) (warning, 
following Nietzsche, that the wrong kind of historical study can be bad for “life,” including law); 
Clayton P. Gillette, The Path Dependence of the Law (Nov. 3, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) (pointing out and expanding upon the path dependence aspects of 
Holmes’s argument in The Path of the Law). But see generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) [hereinafter 
Liebowitz & Margolis, Path Dependence] (critiquing path dependence as an analytical 
perspective). The form of path dependence noted by these scholars is primarily of the most 
general form—the insight that past events influence future ones—and does not bear the 
specific characteristics or yield the specific predictions that I discuss below. Indeed, this form of 
the theory “has the unfortunate consequence of not distinguishing path-dependent analysis 
from most other types of sociological explanation.” James Mahoney, Uses of Path Dependence 
in Historical Sociology 4 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Thus far, 
no one has engaged in an in-depth analysis of the insights that can be gained by applying 
specific forms of path dependence theory to the common law. Instead, the application of path 
dependence theory in the legal literature has been limited largely to explanations of patterns of 
change in corporate structures and corporate governance. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
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Applying path dependence theory to the law leads to both striking 
insights and troubling conclusions. It reveals, for example, that courts’ early 
resolutions of legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change. 
This inflexibility can lead to inefficiency when legal rules fail to respond to 
changing underlying conditions. Path dependence theory also indicates that 
final outcomes will be difficult to predict ex ante, because they are highly 
dependent upon early decisions, which are in turn difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict. The theory further suggests that the opportunities for 
significant legal change in a common law system are brief and intermittent, 
occurring during critical junctures when new legal issues arise or higher 
courts or legislatures intercede. Moreover, it leads to the unsettling 
conclusion that the order in which cases arrive in the courts can significantly 
affect the specific legal doctrine that ultimately results. 
Path dependence theory thus has relevance for both legal scholarship 
and legal practice. It guides legal practitioners to concentrate their 
resources on altering the path of the law, and it provides a new basis for 
scholars to question and refine the doctrine of stare decisis, which creates 
the law’s path-dependent character. Indeed, path dependence theory raises 
once again the question of when the doctrine of stare decisis should 
govern—when, that is, the deleterious consequences of the path 
dependence that stare decisis engenders might justify modifying or relaxing 
this central tenet of our legal system. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of path 
dependence theory. It outlines the theory and briefly describes three 
separate strands of the theory: increasing returns path dependence, 
evolutionary path dependence, and sequencing path dependence, which are 
rooted in the economics, biological, and rational choice theory literatures, 
respectively. Although each of these strands has specific and unique 
characteristics, they are linked by a central insight: In each, an outcome or 
decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the path leading to it. 
Each of these strands of path dependence in turn has important 
implications for the course and pattern of change in the common law 
system. Accordingly, Part II applies path dependence theory to the common 
law. At the core of the common law system is the requirement that courts 
adhere to the body of principles and rules of action that derive their 
authority “solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from 
the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and 
enforcing such usages and customs.”13 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, 
higher courts’ previous decisions are controlling, courts give their own 
 
127 (1999); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausnev, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting , 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 641 (1996). 
 13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “common law”). 
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decisions significant weight, and courts look to non-binding decisions for 
persuasive precedent. Consequently, although there is some flexibility in the 
system, precedent remains central to legal deliberation. 
The doctrine of stare decisis thus creates an explicitly path-dependent 
process. Later decisions rely on, and are constrained by, earlier decisions. 
More important, the way in which history shapes legal outcomes 
corresponds to the three-fold division introduced in Part I. Because each 
legal decision increases the probability that the next will take a particular 
form, the common law exhibits increasing returns path dependence. 
Because the law changes through a process of punctuated yet historically 
constrained evolution, the common law exhibits evolutionary path 
dependence. And because the legal process involves sequential decision 
making in a process marked by competing alternatives and multiple actors, 
the common law exhibits sequencing path dependence. Therefore, just as 
biological and social processes are constrained by history, the law is firmly 
guided by the heavy hand of the past. 
Finally, Part III turns from the descriptive to the normative. It analyzes 
the implications of path dependence theory for the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Path dependence theory reveals that significant costs may arise out of the 
reliance on precedent in a common law system. The Article concludes with 
the claim that, all other things being equal, where the costs of path 
dependence are expected to be especially significant, courts should consider 
relaxing the doctrine of stare decisis. This prescription not only supports 
modifying existing practices of reliance upon precedent, but also provides a 
theoretical basis for some existing distinctions in the degree that judges rely 
on certain categories of precedent. 
I. PATH DEPENDENCE THEORY 
The broad rubric of “path dependence” has been used in a variety of 
contexts to describe separate, but related, phenomena. In this Article, I 
argue that there are in fact three strands of path dependence theory. Each 
has specific, identifiable characteristics and, as I describe in Part II, each has 
important implications for the course and pattern of change in our common 
law system. 
The first variant of path dependence, increasing returns path 
dependence, grows out of the economics literature.14 Increasing returns 
 
 14. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Path Dependence, supra note 12, at 205 (noting the origins of 
this variant of path dependence theory); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence 
and the Study of Politics 3-7 (Oct. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Pierson, Increasing Returns] 
(unpublished paper, presented at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University) (on 
file with author) (discussing the origins of this variant of path dependence theory). A few 
scholars have sought to break what I term “increasing returns path dependence” into separate 
categories of claims. See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, Path Dependence, supra note 12, at 207 
(separating out the claims of what they call first, second, and third degree path dependence); 
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path dependence arises where there are economies of increasing returns—
increasing the productive input yields more than a proportionate increase in 
output.15 Path dependence occurs because once a court makes an initial 
decision, it is less costly to continue down that same path than it is to change 
to a different path.16 
A second variant of path dependence, evolutionary path dependence, 
draws on biological theory. There are, in turn, two separate strands of 
evolutionary path dependence. The first relies on the Darwinian claim that 
differential reproductive success of individual organisms leads to the gradual 
and progressive evolution of species.17 The second relies on a newer theory 
of evolution that focuses on “punctuated equilibria.”18 Under this theory, 
species change little during most of their existence. This stability is 
punctuated by periods of rapid adaptation. Thus, change occurs in fits and 
starts rather than in slow and steady gradual steps.19 Although the 
hypothesized pattern of change is different in the two forms of evolutionary 
path dependence, the key insight is the same: Evolution is directly 
constrained by history. The possibilities for today and tomorrow are 
determined by the evolutionary changes of the past. 
A third and final variant of path dependence theory is sequencing path 
dependence. This variant draws primarily on rational choice theory. 
Sequencing path dependence leads to the striking conclusion that where 
there are three or more choosers and three or more alternative outcomes, 
the sequence in which alternatives are considered can decisively influence 
 
Roe, supra note 12, at 647-53 (dividing path dependence claims into “weak,” “semi-strong,” and 
“strong”); Pierson, Increasing Returns, supra, at 3 (breaking path dependence into what he calls 
“broad” and “narrow” path dependence theory). 
 15. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW & F. J. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS  57-58, 
152-53 (1971) (discussing increasing returns, as opposed to diminishing returns ). 
 16. As Margaret Levi puts it: 
Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or 
region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be 
other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements 
obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a 
tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches 
and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from 
one to the other—and essential if the chosen branch dies—the branch on which a 
climber begins is the one she tends to follow. 
Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE 28 (Mark Irving 
Lichbach ed., 1997). 
 17. DARWIN, supra note 7, at 130-72 (describing the process of natural sele ction). 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 48-54 (describing the theory of “punctuated 
equilibria”). 
 19. See NILES ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES: THE RETHINKING OF  DARWINIAN EVOLUTION AND 
THE THEORY OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA 118-122 (1985) [hereinafter ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES] 
(describing the emergence of the theory of punctuated equilibria). 
HATHAWAY-CONV(3)[1]  3/28/2003 3:29 PM 
108 86 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2001] 
the outcome. Thus, the order in which the alternatives are considered—or 
the path by which they are selected—shapes the outcome.20 
A. INCREASING RETURNS PATH DEPENDENCE 
A variant of path dependence theory that uses the idea of increasing 
returns to explain persistent market imperfections emerged in the 
economics literature of the 1980s as part of a renewed wave of attention by 
scholars to increasing returns economics.21 Of course, the idea of increasing 
returns (also known as “decreasing cost conditions”) was hardly new. Adam 
Smith emphasized increasing returns to explain specialization and economic 
growth in his seminal work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations.22 Similarly, in the mid-1800s, A.A. Cournot developed theories of 
 
 20. Path dependence theory bears some resemblance to “rational herding” or 
“information cascades” theory. In information cascades theory, positive feedback loops result 
from imperfect information and decisionmakers’ consequent rational and strategic decisions to 
emulate the actions of others who have faced similar decisions. Eric Talley offers a persuasive 
critique of this theory as applied to the common law. See generally Eric Talley, Precedential 
Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999). That critique is not, however, applicable to 
path dependence theory, as the feedback loops in information cascades and the three forms of 
path dependence outlined here derive from largely distinct sources. See generally Abhijit V. 
Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON . 797 (1992) (describing and applying a 
theory of information cascades); Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirchleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory 
of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 
(1992) (describing and applying a theory of information cascades); David Hirshleifer, The Blind 
Leading the Blind, Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades , in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF 
BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995) (same); Roger Larocca & 
William McLauchlan, Informational Cascades in State Appellate Courts (Sept. 1, 2000) 
(unpublished paper, presented at the American Political Science Association) (on file with 
author) (using an information cascade model to explain patterns in state supreme court 
decision making). 
 21. International trade theorists, in particular, began to develop models of trade based on 
monopolistic competition—competition under conditions of increasing returns. See generally 
AVINASH K. DIXIT & VICTOR NORMAN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A DUAL, GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH (1980) (describing a model of trade that incorporates and accounts for 
increasing returns); ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN 
TRADE:  INCREASING RETURNS,  IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
(1984) (same); Elhanan Helpman, Increasing Returns, Imperfect Markets, and Trade Theory, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 325 (Ronald W. Jones & Peter B. Kenen eds., 1984) 
(same); Paul Krugman, New Theories of Trade Among Industrial Countries, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 
343 (1983) (same). For more on the international trade literature regarding increasing returns, 
see infra note 43. The story of the growth of the literature surrounding increasing returns 
economics is still hotly contested. See Paul Krugman, The Legend of Arthur: A Tale of Gullibility at 
The New Yorker, at http://www.slate.com/dismal/98-01-14/dismal.asp (posted Jan. 14, 1998), 
and responses thereto at http://slate.msn.com/Features/Krugman/ Krugman.asp (posted Jan. 
30, 1998). The reaction by Krugman and others appears to have been provoked in part by what 
they consider an inaccurate recounting of the rise of increasing returns economics in W. 
MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY (1992), and a similar story in The New Yorker, John Cassidy, 
The Force of an Idea, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 32-37. The story recounted here includes 
only the elements of the story on which most scholars would agree. 
 22. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
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monopoly and oligopoly to explain the effects of increasing returns.23 And 
in the late 1800s, Alfred Marshall examined what he termed the “Law of 
Increasing Returns.”24 In the decades that followed, other scholars 
continued to explore the implications of increasing returns for imperfect 
competition.25 
In the economy, increasing returns arise primarily from four 
characteristics: large set up or fixed costs, which lead to falling unit costs as 
output increases; learning effects, which lower costs as a product becomes 
more common; coordination effects, which confer benefits for taking action 
similar to others; and self-reinforcing or adaptive expectations, which lead 
actors to react to current conditions in ways that enhance the likelihood that 
similar conditions will persist in the future.26 In processes that exhibit these 
characteristics, a step in one direction decreases the cost (or increases the 
benefit) of an additional step in the same direction, creating a powerful 
cycle of self-reinforcing activity or positive feedback. 
Increasing returns path-dependent processes have several identifiable 
properties.27 First, there is indeterminacy of outcome. Unlike in classical 
economics, in which decreasing returns lead to a single, predictable 
equilibrium, multiple equilibria are possible in increasing returns 
processes.28 The outcome of a process that exhibits increasing returns is 
therefore indeterminate and unpredictable ex ante. W. Brian Arthur, whose 
work is among the earliest to link increasing returns to path dependence 
theory, illustrates this quality by reference to a mathematical illustration 
termed the “Polya urn process.”29 The Polya urn is an urn that contains two 
 
(1776). 
 23. AUGUSTIN A. COURNOT,  RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
THEORY OF WEALTH 56-66 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., The Macmillan Co. 1927) (1838). 
 24. 1 ALFRED MARSHALL,  PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 319 (5th ed. 1907) (1890) (defining 
the “Law of Increasing Returns” as follows: “An increase of capital and labour leads generally to 
an improved organization. . . [which in turn] gives a return increased more than in 
proportion.”). 
 25.  For examples of such works, see W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH 
DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); NICHOLAS KALDOR, ECONOMICS WITHOUT EQUILIBRIUM 
(1985); and JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). 
 26. See W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in ARTHUR, supra note 25, 
at 112 [hereinafter Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms]. All four characteristics need not be 
present in order for there to be increasing returns. See id . at 112. 
 27. This typology borrows heavily from Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms, supra note 26; 
and W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Small 
Events, 99 ECON J. 116 (1989), reprinted in ARTHUR, supra note 25 [hereinafter Arthur, Competing 
Technologies]. Arthur adds a fourth property to the three listed here: “possible inefficiency.” 
Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms, supra note 26, at 113. Because that property appears to be 
largely a consequence of two other properties—lock-in and nonergodicity—I do not treat it as a 
separate property. I agree, however, that possible inefficiency is an important consequence of 
increasing returns path dependence, as I discuss below. 
 28. See Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms, supra note 26, at 112. 
 29. The term gets its name from mathematician George Polya. For early works using the 
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balls, one red and one white. The experimenter randomly chooses and 
removes one ball and returns it to the urn with a ball of the same color, 
repeating the process until the urn fills with balls. In this example, there is 
no way to predict in advance the final ratio of red to white balls for any 
individual trial. The most we can say is that the final ratio of balls is a 
random variable uniformly distributed between zero and one.30 Similarly, in 
markets that exhibit unlimited increasing returns economies, it is not 
possible to predict which firm will dominate the market based on firm 
attributes alone: Just as the outcome of the Polya urn process is heavily 
dependent on early draws, the final shape of a market that exhibits such 
increasing returns is heavily dependent on early events.31 
Second, increasing returns processes often lead to lock-in or 
inflexibility. An example best illustrates this property. In the Polya urn 
experiment, the ratio in any individual trial will eventually reach an 
equilibrium or, in mathematical terms, approach a limit. Later draws in the 
series will not significantly alter the distribution of balls in the urn.32 
Likewise, in markets involving activities that offer greater returns the more 
they are undertaken, the activity that is chosen first will be much more likely 
to be chosen thereafter.33 Markets involving new technologies provide a 
good example of this dynamic.34 An industry exploring a new engineering 
or economic possibility may consider several different technologies that 
could be used to realize that possibility. The industry will likely select the 
undeveloped technology that appears to offer a small advantage over the 
others. As it is developed, the technology gradually improves so that the 
industry increasingly prefers it to the undeveloped, unimproved 
technologies. The initially selected technology thus becomes locked in and 
will continue to be dominant even if it later becomes apparent that an 
equally developed alternative could have been superior.35 Rational 
expectations can play an important role in encouraging these lock-in effects. 
 
Polya urn process to illustrate path dependence, see W. Brian Arthur et al., On Generalized Urn 
Schemes of the Polya Kind, 19 CYBERNETICS 61 (1983); W. Brian Arthur et al., Strong Laws for a Class 
of Path -Dependent Urn Processes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION, KIEV (1985), reprinted in ARTHUR, supra note 25, at 185-201. The 
following example draws heavily from W. Brian Arthur et al., Path -Dependent Processes and the 
Emergence of Macrostructure, in ARTHUR, supra note 25, at 36-38 [hereinafter Arthur et al., Path -
Dependent Processes]; and Pierson, Increasing Returns, supra note 14, at 6. 
 30. See Arthur et al., Path -Dependent Processes, supra note 29, at 36. 
 31. See Arthur, Competing Technologies, supra note 27, at 116. 
 32. See Arthur et al., Path -Dependent Processes, supra note 29, at 36. 
 33. Not all markets exhibiting increasing returns tend to lock-in monopoly outcomes. 
When there is con sumer heterogeneity, an increasing returns market can be shared. See, e.g., 
Arthur, Competing Technologies, supra note 27, at 25-26 (discussing examples of this market 
phenomenon). 
 34. Id. at 15-26; Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms, supra note 26, at 116. 
 35. See Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms, supra note 26, at 116. 
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When a product is slightly better than then-existing alternatives, the 
increased probability that it will do well in the market will enhance 
expectations of its success. This can hasten the transition to a monopoly 
outcome.36 
Third, increasing returns processes tend toward nonergodicity, as small 
early events can significantly affect the eventual outcome.37 For instance, the 
final outcome of the Polya urn test depends strongly on the outcome of 
early, random draws.38 In an increasing returns industry, small events can 
gradually cumulate to lock the market into the monopoly of an inferior 
technology. Consequently, as an early article on increasing returns path 
dependence explains, “it is sometimes not possible to uncover the logic (or 
illogic) of the world around us except by understanding how it got that 
way.”39 
The development of the Qwerty typewriter keyboard provides an oft-
cited example of the characteristics and consequences of increasing returns 
processes.40 According to Paul A. David, the Qwerty keyboard’s ascendance 
into dominance during the 1890s occurred largely because of the advent of 
touch typing. The early adaptation of touch typing to the Qwerty keyboard 
led to significant learning costs, coordination effects, and self-reinforcing 
expectations that favored the keyboard arrangement. Typists had to invest 
significant time into learning a particular keyboard arrangement; therefore 
it was costly for typists who were familiar with one keyboard arrangement to 
learn a different one. Coordination effects emerged because the new 
typewriter system required technical interrelatedness between the keyboard 
and the touch typist’s memory. As a result, the process possessed significant 
economies of scale: The larger the number of individuals familiar with a 
particular keyboard arrangement, the lower the overall user cost of a 
typewriter system based on that arrangement. Finally, self-reinforcing 
 
 36. See id. at 128. See generally Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, 
and Innovation, 16 RAND. J. ECON. 70 (1985). 
 37. See Arthur, Competing Technologies, supra note 27, at 14. 
 38. See Arthur et al., Path -Dependent Processes, supra note 29, at 38. 
 39. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332 (1985). 
 40. The “Qwerty keyboard” gets its name from its six upper left-hand keys. The top line of 
the Qwerty keyboard was arranged at least in part to make it possible for salespersons to quickly 
and easily demonstrate the machine by quickly typing the name of the company that produced 
it—Typewriter. The details of this example derive directly from David, supra note 39. Notably, 
the historical accuracy of the Qwe rty example has been questioned. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen 
E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1990) (arguing that the Qwerty example 
given in Paul David’s 1985 article is “an example of market failure that will not withstand the 
rigorous examination of the historical record”). David has written several unpublished papers 
in response to the critiques of the Qwerty example, including, most notably, Paul A. David, At 
Last, a Remedy for Chronic QWERTY-Skepticism (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) [hereinafter David, At Last, a Remedy]. Despite the debate over its accuracy, the 
example continues to be considered one of the early illustrations of path dependence theory’s 
central insights. 
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expectations further solidified the Qwerty keyboard’s dominance: Employers 
purchased Qwerty keyboards because they expected more typists to be able 
to use them than the alternative available arrangements, and typists invested 
in learning the Qwerty keyboard arrangement because they expected that 
more employers would supply it. Because of these strong learning, 
coordination, and self-reinforcing expectation effects, the Qwerty keyboard’s 
early dominance allowed it to become locked in as the dominant keyboard 
arrangement despite the apparent superiority of later-developed keyboard 
arrangements. Thus, the increasing returns characteristics of the typewriter 
keyboard process may have driven the industry into standardization of the 
“wrong system.”41 
Scholars have used increasing returns path dependence to explain a 
wide array of other apparent failures of standard economic theory. For 
example, Paul Krugman and W. Brian Arthur both use the increasing 
returns variant of path dependence theory to explain the importance of 
history in determining industry location patterns.42 Some of the earliest 
work on increasing returns path dependence was done in the field of 
international political economy: The incorporation of increasing returns 
into trade theory required the modification of some of the central tenets of 
trade theory and helped solve some of its deepest puzzles.43 More recently, 
 
 41. See David, At Last, a Remedy, supra note 40, at 336 (stating that this “was a situation in 
which the precise details of timing in the development sequence had made it privately 
profitable in the short run to adopt machines to the habits of men”). 
 42. As Krugman puts it in a 1991 article in which he uses path dependence theory to 
explain the persistence of the U.S. manufacturing belt, “[i]f there is one single area of 
economics in which path dependence is unmistakable, it is in economic geography—the location 
of production in space.” Paul Krugman, History and Industry Location: The Case of the 
Manufacturing Belt, 81 AM. ECON . REV. 80, 80 (1991). Arthur also argues that the process of 
industry geography is highly path dependent, but he focuses instead on the more specific 
question of why particular industries tend to be geographically concentrated. The key factor to 
explaining the concentration of an industry, he finds, is whether the industry possesses 
economies of agglomeration, that is, whether firms in the industry receive increasing net 
benefits from locating near firms in the same industry as the number of firms in the same 
location increases. See W. Brian Arthur, Industry Location Patterns and the Importance of History, in 
ARTHUR, supra note 25, at 49-67; see also W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedback in the Economy, 262 SCI. 
AM. 92, 95 (1990) (arguing that “the random historical sequence of firms entering the industry 
determines which pattern of regional settlement results”). 
 43. For example, scholars used increasing returns to explain why trade between countries 
often failed to fit the predictions of the theory of comparative advantage. See HELPMAN & 
KRUGMAN, supra note 21, at 2-5, 205-09 (detailing the shortcomings of conventional trade 
theory, including its “apparent failure to explain the volume of trade, the composition of trade, 
the volume and role of intrafirm trade and direct foreign investment, and the welfare effects of 
trade liberalization,” and arguing that where transportation costs are low, small differences in 
country size will lead increasing returns products to be produced in the country with the larger 
domestic market). For other international political economy works drawing on increasing 
returns economics, see, for example, R.W. Jones & J.P. Neary, The Positive Theory of International 
Trade, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: SURVEYS OF THEORY AND POLICY 48-50 (Ronald W. Jones ed., 
1986); and DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 21, at 265-95. 
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Douglass North used increasing returns path dependence to explain 
institutional emergence and change.44 And in recent years, scholars have 
paid significant new attention to the ways in which the increasing returns 
variant of path dependence can be used to explain broader political 
processes.45 
Despite their varied topics, these separate veins of scholarship share the 
same basic insight: Where a process of change exhibits increasing returns 
dynamics, each step in one direction makes additional steps in that same 
direction more likely. This characteristic leads to predictable results and 
helps explain why some processes of change fail to evolve toward a single, 
stable, efficient equilibrium. As we shall see in Part II, similar observations 
can be made regarding the pattern of legal change in a common law system. 
B. EVOLUTIONARY PATH DEPENDENCE 
A second variant of path dependence theory draws on analogies to 
 
 44. North explains that the institutional framework of a polity and economy —defined 
broadly as the rules and informal constraints, and their enforcement characteristics, that shape 
human interaction —is characterized by increasing returns. Consequently, incremental change 
is heavily weighted in favor of policies consistent with the existing institutional framework. As an 
organization evolves to capture the highest payoffs available under the existing framework, it 
gradually alters the institutional constraints within which it operates in a way that reinforces the 
initial direction of its effort. Hence, the direction of the polity, like that of the economy, is 
difficult to reverse. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 92-104 (1990); Douglass C. North, The Historical Evolution of 
Politics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1994); Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of 
Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355, 364-66 (1990) [hereinafter North, A Transaction Cost Theory]. 
 45. Paul Pierson provides an insightful overview of the application of increasing returns 
path dependence to political science and suggests how its application to politics is both similar 
to and different from its application in economics. See Pierson, Increasing Returns, supra note 
14; see generally Paul Pierson, The Limits of Institutional Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and 
Change, GOVERNANCE  (forthcoming 2000) (applying increasing returns path dependence 
theory to explain political processes); Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence 
in Political Processes, STUD. AM. POL. DEV. (forthcoming 2000) (same); Paul Pierson, When Effect 
Becomes Cause, 45 WORLD POL. 595 (1993) (same). Pierson’s work follows and draws upon, 
among others: CHARLES E.  LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS:  THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 3 (1977) (examining the interaction between politics and economics); 
NORTH, supra note 44 (developing an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which 
institutions and institutional change affect economic development); Stephen D. Krasner, 
Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics, 16 COMP.  POL. 223, 234-38 
(1984) (examining the interaction between institutions and their environment); Terry M. Moe, 
The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984) (providing an overview of the 
“new economics of organization” and exploring its implications for the study of public 
bureaucracy); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, 
in ORGANIZATION THEORY:  FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 116-53 
(Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995) (arguing that political science is fertile territory for “new 
economics of organization” theory, but noting that political scientists should explore the 
aspects of the theory that are unique to political science, rather than simply extend the 
economic theory to politics and sketching a new theory of public bureaucracy using the insights 
of new economics); North, A Transaction Cost Theory, supra note 44 (providing a transaction 
costs framework for unde rstanding political and economic instit utions). 
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biological evolution. In its classical form, the biological version of path 
dependence reflects the paradigm of Darwinian “survival of the fittest.” A 
newer form of this version of evolutionary path dependence relies on a more 
recent (and controversial) evolutionary model that I call “new evolutionary 
theory.” Under this model, evolution is not gradual or incremental, but 
instead is characterized by “punctuated equilibria”: long periods of stability 
followed by short bursts of rapid change. 
Classical evolutionary theory posits that evolution occurs primarily 
through slow and gradual divergence of forms. Natural variation in the 
population combined with competition for limited resources leads to 
natural selection: Some organisms will be more “fit” than others—better 
equipped to survive and thus to reproduce.46 The differential reproductive 
success of individual organisms in turn leads to the gradual and progressive 
evolution of species.47 
New evolutionary theory, by contrast, claims that evolution is 
characterized by periods of stasis followed by sudden change. In a model 
that biologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould termed “punctuated 
equilibrium,”48 species change relatively little during most of their 
 
 46. See DARWIN, supra note 7, at  130-72 (describing the process of natural selection); NILES 
ELDREDGE, REINVENTING DARWIN 37-39 (1995) [hereinafter ELDREDGE, REINVENTING DARWIN] 
(discussing conceptions of “fitness”). 
 47. A contemporary of Darwin’s, Thomas Henry Huxley, cautioned Darwin not to rely so 
heavily on his claim that evolution must be gradual. Huxley wrote, “You have loaded yourself 
with an unnecessary difficulty in adopting ‘Natura non facit saltum’ so unreservedly.” 
ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 27 (quoting an 1859 letter from Huxley to Darwin). 
Some scholars have contested the characterization of Darwin as advocating simple “phyletic 
gradualism.” They point out that Darwin’s theory does not in any way preclude periods of stasis 
followed by periods of rapid change and that there are many passages in On the Origin of Species 
by Means of Natural Selection in which Darwin indicates that evolution may proceed at a variety of 
rates. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING 
OF LIFE 282-99 (1995); David Penny, Charles Darwin, Gradualism and Punctuated Equilibrium, 32 
SYSTEMATIC ZOOLOGY 72, 72-74 (1983); F.H.T. Rhodes, Gradualism, Punctuated Equilibrium, and 
the Origin of the Species, 305 NATURE 269, 269-72 (1983). But see ELDREDGE, REINVENTING DARWIN, 
supra note 46, at 64-78 (arguing that Darwin viewed evolution as slow and gradual); ELDREDGE, 
TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 27 (arguing that “Darwin was less a pluralist in these matters 
than some these days would have him”). 
 48. The term was introduced to the scientific community in a groundbreaking article by 
Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated 
Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82-115 (Thomas J.M. 
Schopf ed., 1972), reprinted in ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 193; see also ELDREDGE, 
TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 119 (discussing origination of the “punctuated equilibria” 
concept). The theory of punctuated equilibria has been hotly contested since its introduction. 
See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 11, 83-84 (1995) (arguing that, contrary to the 
theory of punctuated equlibria, a key feature of evolution is its gradualness); DENNETT, supra 
note 47, at 282-99 (disputing elements of Eldredge and Gould’s theory of punctuated 
equilibria, particularly the claim that it is distinctly different from classical Darwinism); 
ELDREDGE, REINVENTING DARWIN, supra note 46, at 93-104 (describing the emergence of the 
idea of punctuated equilibria and the reaction, particularly of paleontologists, to it); ELDREDGE, 
TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 92-97, 120-22 (same). The debate is complicated by the fact that 
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existence.49 This stability is punctuated by periods during which new species 
rapidly branch off from a persisting parental stock in a process of 
“speciation.”50 Evolution results from the occurrence of these punctuations 
and the differential survival of the species they produce. The process of 
speciation is usually sparked when “a small local population becomes 
isolated at the margin of the geographic range of its parent species.”51 
Under this theory, the local populations, termed “peripheral isolates,” 
quickly differentiate from the parent species because of the rapid adaptation 
of the small population to a distinct local environment under conditions of 
genetic isolation.52 Under some circumstances, these peripheral isolates 
develop into a new species, incapable of reintegration into the parent 
species.53 Thus, under new evolutionary theory, change occurs primarily in 
fits and starts rather than in slow and steady gradual steps.54 
In the punctuated equilibrium model, as in the increasing returns path 
dependence model, the ultimate outcome of a process of change is usually 
 
Eldredge and Gould appear to have always held slightly different ideas of what constitute 
“punctuated equilibria” and, moreover, have modified their views of the theory since its first 
introduction. See DENNETT, supra note 47, at 283-84 (claiming that Gould has “several times 
changed his mind” about whether the theory of punctuated equilibria was a revolutionary 
refutation of Darwinian gradualism); ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 16 (“From the 
very beginning . . . Stephen Jay Gould and I have differed to some extent on the significance, 
the implications—and even, on occasion, some aspect of basic content—of ‘punctuated 
equilibria.’”); id. (revealing Eldredge’s current and past views of the theory of punct uated 
equilibria). 
 49. See ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 15 (“Punctuated equilibria still strikes 
me as an exceedingly simple idea: at base, it says that once a species evolves, it will usually not 
undergo great change as it continues its existence.”). 
 50. STEPHEN JAY GOULD,  THE PANDA’S THUMB 182 (1982) [hereinafter GOULD,  THE 
PANDA’S THUMB]. 
 51. Eldredge & Gould, supra note 48, at 203. The process of speciation occasionally results 
from the isolation of much larger portions of a species. See ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, supra note 
19, at 116. 
 52. These changes are “rapid” only in ecological or geological terms: an episode of “rapid” 
speciation may take 5000 to 50,000 years. See ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 121. 
 53. See Eldredge & Gould, supra note 48, at 203. A central measure of whether two 
populations of organisms are part of the same species is termed the “reproductive criterion” for 
delimiting species—whether the two populations interbreed in nature. See ELDREDGE,  TIME 
FRAMES, supra note 19, at 116-17. 
 54. This description of evolutionary theory is consistent with the fossil record, which 
generally contains abrupt transitions and few intermediate forms (a fact that classical 
Darwinists, including Darwin himself, explain as merely a reflection of the imperfect fossil 
record). See ELDREDGE,  TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 21-22; GOULD,  THE PANDA’S THUMB, 
supra note 50, at 189; Eldredge & Gould, supra note 48, at 199; see also STEPHEN JAY GOULD, 
WONDERFUL LIFE:  THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF HISTORY (1989) (describing the 
Burgess Shale of British Columbia, a major fossil locality, and exploring its implications for 
evolutionary theory). Darwin devoted two chapters of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection to explaining the discontinuity between his theory of evolution and the fossil record. See 
ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, supra note 19, at 25-26 (discussing Darwin’s defense of his 
evolutionary theory in the face of the fossil record evidence). 
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indeterminate because punctuated equilibria are marked by “contingency”: 
“the inability of the theory to predict or explain, either deterministically or 
probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific outcome.”55 A contingent event 
is not necessarily random, but it cannot be explained by the variables 
available to theorists. For example, biologists would treat a cold winter as 
contingent because it is outside the explanatory framework of biological 
theories. Because it is marked by contingency, the punctuated equilibria 
model is unable to predict the arrival of periods of rapid change in advance. 
Once a period of change has occurred, however, the theory specifies that a 
new period of stability shaped by the changes that occurred during the most 
recent punctuation will follow. 
Despite their differences, classical evolutionary theory and new 
evolutionary theory agree that the evolutionary changes of the past directly 
determine the possibilities for today and tomorrow. As a result, both 
theories posit, evolutionary processes do not always, or perhaps even often, 
result in a perfectly optimal outcome.56 The creatures that arise out of 
evolutionary processes may be better adapted to their environment than 
species that failed to survive,57 but they are far from perfect. A famous 
example of the odd arrangements that arise out of the process of evolution 
is the so-called panda’s thumb: a sixth digit that grew out of the radial 
sesamoid (normally a small component of the wrist) of the existing anatomy 
of the panda’s forebears.58 The “thumb” is awkward and far from perfect, 
but it allows the panda to strip leaves fairly effectively and efficiently from its 
main food source, bamboo shoots.59 This clumsy but workable solution is 
strong evidence of the evolutionary path that led to it.60 
Evolutionary theory thus provides two competing models of the pattern 
of change in natural systems: one describes a process of slow and steady 
change and the other a process of long periods of stasis followed by brief 
periods of rapid change. In both, developments in the past constrain the 
processes of change in important and predictable ways. These characteristics 
 
 55. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 7. 
 56. As Stephen Jay Gould notes, “you cannot demonstrate evolution with perfection 
because perfection need not have a history.” GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB, supra note 50, at 28. 
 57. This assumes, of course, that the environment has not changed substantially since the 
selection process took place. Indeed, it is possible that a species that died out in one 
environment might have flourished in an environment that emerged after its extinction. 
 58. See id . at 21-22; see also Stephen J. Gould & R. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and 
the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme, B 205 PROC.  ROYAL SOC’Y 
LONDON  581, 581 (1979) (arguing that the process of evolution is “so constrained by phyletic 
heritage, pathways of development and general architecture that the constraints themselves 
become more interesting and more important in delimiting pathways of change than the 
selective force that may mediate change when it occurs”). But see DENNETT, supra note 47, at 
267-82 (critiquing Gould and Lewontin’s view of adaptation). 
 59. See GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB, supra note 50, at 21. 
 60. See id. at 29. 
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are not exclusive, however, to biological evolution. As Part II demonstrates, 
the processes of biological change parallel patterns of change in the law and 
can help us better understand the process of change in the common law 
system. 
C. SEQUENCING PATH DEPENDENCE 
Social choice theory and game theory offer yet another overlapping but 
distinct variant of path dependence: sequencing path dependence. This 
variant of path dependence draws from these literatures the simple but 
important observation that even when actors are rational and have well-
specified preferences, the order in which alternatives are presented can 
significantly affect the outcome. 
This insight is rooted in one of social choice theory’s early and still 
central observations: Kenneth J. Arrow’s “General Impossibility Theorem.”61 
In brief, Arrow’s theorem states that when there are three or more choosers 
and three or more alternative outcomes, “no method of amalgamating 
individual judgments can simultaneously satisfy some reasonable conditions 
of fairness on the method and a condition of logicality on the result,”62 if 
logicality is defined as a complete and transitive ordering of alternatives.63 In 
other words, it tells us that when there are three or more choosers and three 
or more alternatives, no selection process can be both fair and logical. This 
is true of virtually any group selection procedure that one might devise. 
Indeed, Arrow’s theorem implies that “an intransitive social ordering of 
outcomes can characterize a group that uses nearly any procedure for 
ordering alternatives (short of dictatorship in which one member’s 
preference is decisive).”64 This prediction holds true even when all 
individuals are entirely rational, that is, each individual’s preferences are 
 
 61. KENNETH J. ARROW,  SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 1963) 
[hereinafter ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE]. The theorem is also known as the “General Possibility 
Theorem.” WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 116 (1982). 
 62. RIKER, supra note 61, at 116. 
 63. See ARROW,  SOCIAL CHOICE , supra note 61, at 22-32, 46-60. Arrow’s conditions of 
fairness, as summarized and restated by Riker are: (1) universal admissibility of individual 
orderings; (2) monotonicity (the social ordering responds positively to alterations in individual 
values, or at least not negatively); (3) citizens’ sovereignty or nonimposition of the outcome; (4) 
unanimity or pareto optimality (if everyone prefers x to y, then the social choice function does 
not choose y); (5) independence of irrelevant alternatives—that is, the choice to be made 
among a set S of alternatives is independent of the preferences of individuals for alternatives 
not in S; (6) nondictatorship (there is no person who can dictate the outcome). RIKER, supra 
note 61, at 116-19. The definition of rationality or logicality as requiring, at a minimum, 
transitivity, has long been widely accepted by scholars (though not without some dissent). See 
William H. Riker, The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments, 52 AM. 
POL.  SCI.  REV. 349, 350-52 (1958). For a formal proof of Arrow’s theorem, see DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 186-88 (1979). 
 64. PETER C. ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER 25 (1992). 
HATHAWAY-CONV(3)[1]  3/28/2003 3:29 PM 
118 86 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2001] 
complete and transitive.65 
Where there is intransitivity in social orderings, path dependence 
necessarily exists, for where there is intransitive social ordering of outcomes, 
the path by which the alternatives are presented must affect the outcome.66 
Arrow himself recognized this phenomenon in a passage in the second 
edition of Social Choice and Individual Values,67 which he added in response to 
charges, made after the publication of the first edition, that he was 
illegitimately transferring properties of individual choice to social choice.68 
Arrow wrote, “the importance of the transitivity condition” involves “the 
independence of the final choice from the path to it.” 69 “Transitivity,” he 
explained, “will insure this independence; from any environment, there will 
be a chosen alternative, and, in the absence of a deadlock, no place for the 
historically given alternative to be chosen by default.”70 Citing the work of 
Robert Dahl and William Riker, he noted that intransitive social choice 
mechanisms may produce “decisions that are clearly unsatisfactory.”71 He 
thus concluded that “collective rationality” was not “an illegitimate transfer 
from the individual to society, but an important attribute of a genuinely 
democratic system capable of full adaptation to varying environments.”72 
As Arrow recognized, if a social choice system is intransitive, outcomes 
depend on the procedural structure within which they are determined. The 
power to set the agenda can thus become, in a very real sense, the power to 
 
 65. Notably, rational choice theorists bracket the issue of preference formation, generally 
assuming that actors are rational—that is, that they act to maximize their self-interest. Self 
interest, in turn, is derived from the structure of the situation. 
 66. Path independence is defined and justified by one scholar as follows: 
[T]he process of choosing, from a dynamic point of view, frequently proceeds in a 
type of “divide and conquer” manner. The alternatives are “split up” into smaller 
sets, a choice is made over each of these sets, the chosen elements are collected, 
and then a choice is made from them. Path independence, in this case, would 
mean that the final result would be independent of the way the alternatives we re 
initially divided up for consideration. 
Charles R. Plott, Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice, 41 ECONOMETRICA 1075, 1079-
80 (1973). More precisely, path independence exists when, “for any pair of sets S and T, the 
choice from the union of  the sets is the same as the choice from the union of the separate 
choices from each set.” RIKER, supra note 61, at 134. 
 67. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra note 61. 
 68. Plott, supra note 66, at 1078. Plott argues that Arrow’s defense of the rationality 
condition is not entirely convincing, as rationality (defined as transitive and complete ordering 
of preferences) is not necessary for path independence: While all intransitive social ordering 
will lead to path dependence, not all social ordering mechanisms that are path independent are 
rational. Id. at 1075, 1090. The accuracy of this argument is not relevant to the inquiry here, as I 
am concerned with the observation, not contested by Plott, that intransitive (and hence 
irrational) social ordering mechanisms result in path dependence. 
 69. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra note 61, at 120. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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determine the result. This can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume 
that a group uses majority rule to rank three alternatives, A, B, and C. 
Individual 1 prefers A over B and B over C. Individual 2 prefers C over A and 
A over B. Individual 3 prefers B over C and C over A. Each individual’s 
preferences are entirely complete and transitive. However, the result of 
these preferences in a majority voting system, assuming voters vote sincerely 
rather than strategically, is intransitive: A defeats B, B defeats C, and C 
defeats A. This result is known as the Condorcet paradox.73 
Political scientists have explored and expanded this basic insight. For 
example, a large body of literature has investigated the interplay between 
agenda structure and voting strategy in legislatures and committees. The 
foundational work in this area, Robin Farquharson’s 1969 Theory of Voting ,74 
demonstrates how the Condorcet paradox arises from the strategic aspects 
of sequential voting. The literature has arrived at a startling result: If voters 
vote sincerely rather than strategically, that is, they express their true 
preferences between alternatives rather than look ahead to final 
consequences,75 then the agenda-setter (who determines the procedure by 
which the outcome is chosen) can nearly dictate the outcome.76 This, too, 
can be demonstrated with a simple example.77 Consider three actors who 











x y z x 
y z x y 
z x y z 
   x 
 
 
 73. The Condorcet paradox gets its name from the Marquis de Condorcet, who is widely 
regarded as the first to recognize it. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF,  THINKING 
STRATEGICALLY 267-70 (1991) (discussing the paradox); ORDESHOOK, supra note 64, at 24-25 
(same). 
 74. ROBIN FARQUHARSON , THEORY OF VOTING (1969). 
 75. Farquharson explained that when voters act sincerely, “their votes are directly in 
accordance with their preference scales.” Id. at 17. 
 76. See, e.g., Thomas H. Hammond, Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and 
Bureaucratic Politics, 30 AM. J. POL.  SCI. 379, 381-82 (1986) (demonstrating that for sincere 
voting under either successive or amendment procedure, any proposal could be made the 
voting decision, given an appropriate order of voting); Nicholas R. Miller, Graph-Theoretical 
Approaches to the Theory of Voting, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 769, 780-83 (1977) [hereinafter Miller, 
Graph-Theoretical Approaches] (same); Riker, supra note 63, at 362-63 (same). 
 77. This example is drawn directly from Hammond, supra note 76, at 381-82. 
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 These preferences produce the following outcome in a system of 
successive pairwise majority votes: In a majority vote, x would beat y, y would 
beat z, and z would beat x. If the agenda is unconstrained, chaos results. 
Notice, however, that there are three possible binary agendas that could be 
used to choose among these alternati ves: 
(1) Compare x and y, and then pit the winner against z. 
(2) Compare x and z, and then pit the winner against y. 
(3) Compare y and z, and then pit the winner against x. 
Each agenda yields a different final winner. Thus, whoever determines the 
agenda also determines the outcome.78 
The effect of the agenda on the outcome is significantly reduced, 
however, when voters are strategic or sophisticated. A sophisticated voter 
“reaches conclusions about what will happen by successively eliminating 
categories of events that certainly will not happen.”79 In effect, the 
sophisticated voter works backward from the result to determine the best 
course of action at each juncture.80 Thus, “sophisticated voting under 
successive procedure works as if the last two proposals in the voting order 
were paired for a sincere majority vote.”81 Because of the forward-looking 
nature of sophisticated voters, the sophisticated voting decision under 
successive procedure always results in a decision within the “Condorcet 
set”—the set of outcomes of a social choice function such that no point 
outside the set beats or ties any point in the set in a paired comparison.82 
 
 78. This conclusion appears to survive experimental testing. In an early test of an agenda-
setter’s power to determine outcome, Charles Plott and Michael Levine performed experiments 
in which a random group of individuals chose among sets of limited alternatives to test the 
influence of agendas on outcomes. The experiments supported the scholars’ claim that where 
an agenda is fixed, it influences outcomes by limiting the information available to decision 
makers about the patterns of preference in the group and by determining the set of strategies 
available to the individual. See Charles R. Plott & Michael E. Levine, A Model of Agenda Influence 
on Committee Decisions, 68 AM. ECON . REV. 146, 147 (1978) (discussing the strategies available). 
For more on the power of the agenda-setter to determine outcome, see generally Richard D. 
McKelvey, General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 
1085 (1979); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting 
Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 49, 60 (1984). 
 79. FARQUHARSON, supra note 74, at 39-40. 
 80. See, e.g., James M. Enelow & David H. Koehler, The Amendment in Legislative Strategy: 
Sophisticated Voting in the U.S. Congress, 42 J. POL. 396, 399 (1980) (noting that scholars have 
shown, in variety of contexts, that the agenda has less influence on outcome when voters are 
sophisticated); Miller, supra note 76, at 799 (demonstrating that where there is sophisticated 
voting under an amendment procedure, there might be proposals that could not be made the 
outcome under any order of voting); Nicholas Miller, A New Solution Set for Tournaments and 
Majority Voting: Further Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 68 
passim (1980) (demonstrating that sophisticated voting under amendment procedure results in 
Pareto-optimal decisions); Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 78, at 69 (demonstrating that open-
agenda processes with sophisticated voters will result in Pareto-optimal outcomes). 
 81. Miller, Graph -Theoretical Approaches, supra note 76, at 785. 
 82. See id. at 786 (describing the Condorcet set). 
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Thus, it is not possible for the agenda-setter to manipulate the agenda so 
that an outcome outside the Condorcet set results.83 Nevertheless, the 
influence of the agenda is not erased: The agenda may still determine which 
point within the Condorcet set is ultimately selected by the social choice 
process. Indeed, sophisticated voting under successive procedure may result 
in a proposal being adopted, even when every voter prefers some other 
proposal.84 
A similar phenomenon can occur in strategic games among rational 
players. Where there are multiple possible equilibria, the order in which 
players in the game “move” influences which of the possible equilibria will 
be the game’s endpoint. A simple illustration of this is the classic 
coordination game.85 In the most basic coordination game, there are two 
players and two possible meeting locations. Each player receives a positive 
payoff if both players go to the same location, a higher payoff if they meet in 
the player’s preferred location, and no payoff if they fail to meet. There are 
four possible outcomes or equilibria.86 If player A is able to make the first 
move, and player B knows that move (or player A’s preferred location), then 
player A can determine which of the possible equilibria will result. Player B 
will go to player A’s preferred location, even if player B’s payoff would be 
greater if the two players met at a location different from that chosen by 
player A, because this is the only way in which player B can be assured of a 
positive payoff. The “first mover” in this example can thus use her agenda-
setting power to obtain the outcome most favorable to her. Once again the 
sequence of choices or moves determines the outcome.87 
 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 789 (“[S]ophisticated voting under any binary procedure complies with 
the Condorcet criterion.”). 
 84. Miller explains this finding well: 
At first glance, it may appear that the Pareto criterion is redundant in conjunction 
with the Condorcet criterion —that is, it might seem that any proposal meeting the 
latter condition meets the former as well. But in fact the two criteria are 
independent, and the Condorcet set may include proposals that fail to be Pareto-
optimal. Suppose there are four proposals, x, y, z, and v, and three voters: voter 1 
prefers v to x, y to z, voter 2 prefers z to v to x to y, and voter 3 prefers x to y to z to 
v. . . . Proposal x is unanimously preferred to y and so, while all four proposals 
belong to the Condorcet set, only x, z, and v are Pareto-optimal. . . . [I]t follows 
that  . . . both sincere and sophisticated voting under successive procedure may fail 
to comply with the Pareto criterion—that is, in these cases a voting body may adopt 
a proposal y even when every voter prefers some other proposal x to y. 
Id. at 792-93. 
 85. For a more in-depth explanation of cooperative game theory and several simple 
coordination game models, see JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY IN 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE  77-83 (1983). 
 86. Where the parties have incomplete information, the game is “both logically consistent 
and indeterminate” with respect to outcomes. Stephen M. Walt, Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational 
Choice and Security Studies, 23:4 INT’L SECURITY, Spring 1999, at 5, 20. 
 87. A similar result can be derived from a variety of game theoretic models. For example, 
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Game theory and rational choice theory thus describe a third form of 
path dependence that provides yet another view of how the path of history 
can shape processes of change. In systems that demonstrate this form of 
path dependence, the sequence in which the alternatives are considered—
or the path by which they are selected—can influence the outcome. This 
prediction applies to a variety of contexts, including, as Part II demonstrates, 
the common law system. 
With the essential attributes of the three forms of path dependence 
established, Part II of this Article turns to an examination of path 
dependence theory’s relevance to the common law legal system. I seek to 
demonstrate that each variant of path dependence describes important 
aspects of the common law system and thus can be used to better 
understand the development of legal rules in common law legal systems. 
II. THE PATH DEPENDENCE OF THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM 
Path dependence theory is relevant to the common law system for a 
simple reason: the doctrine of stare decisis. Under the doctrine of stare decisis 
et non quieta movere—“let the decision stand and do not disturb things which 
have been settled”88—decisions of higher courts are controlling in 
subsequent cases involving similar circumstances.89 Courts also give their 
own prior decisions great weight, though they are not strictly bound to 
follow their own precedents.90 Furthermore, even when decisions of other 
 
game theory also predicts “herd behavior” where there are problems of information 
aggregation. Under this theory, the first player to make a choice bases his decision on the 
information that he possesses about the available alternatives. Subsequent players, however, 
consider not only the information that they possess but also the decisions of those who chose 
before them. Under these circumstances, game theory predicts that where the players make 
their decisions sequentially and are informed of the decisions of those who precede them, all 
the players will follow the lead of the first. That is true even if the information possessed by the 
group as a whole overwhelmingly suggests that the other alternative is better. See DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 213-17 (1994) (illustrating this theory with 
hypothetical examples). 
 88. Stevens, supra note 2, at 1 n.2 (citation omitted). 
 89. See JOHN C. GRAY,  THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 211 (Roland Gray ed., 
Macmillan 2d ed. 1921) (1972) [hereinafter GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES]. 
 90. Indeed, as a general rule, an American court does not consider itself 
inexorably bound by its own precedents, but, in the interest of uniformity of 
treatment to litigants, and of stability and certainty in the law . . . will follow the 
rule of law which it has established in earlier cases unless clearly convinced that the 
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions 
and that more good than harm would come by departing from precedent. 
James W. Moore & Robert S. Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and the Law of the Case , 21 
TEX. L. REV. 514, 539-40 (1943). John C. Gray has noted: 
We have seen that the House of Lords will not overrule its own prior decision. . . . 
No such doctrine prevails in America; the highest courts in the respective States 
and the Supreme Court of the United States all consider that they have the power, 
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courts are not explicitly binding, they can provide persuasive authority.91 
Judges who follow the doctrine thus generally apply decision rules that entail 
explicit reliance on earlier choices and thereby generate path dependence. 
This is a broad-brush description of the role of precedent in a common 
law system. Under closer scrutiny, the picture is more complex.92 What 
 
however inexpedient it may be to exercise it, to depart from their former rulings. 
GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES, supra note 89, at 242; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE 
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 158 (1921) (“The United States Supreme Court and the highest 
courts of the several states overrule their own prior decisions when manifestly erroneous.”). 
Some courts require that the court meet en banc in order to overrule a previous decision. The 
Federal Circuit’s Rules, for example, include the following provision: 
Although only the court en banc may overrule a binding precedent, a party may 
argue, in its brief and oral argument, to overrule a binding precedent without 
petitioning for hearing en banc. The panel will decide whether to ask the regular 
active judges to consider hearing the case en banc. 
FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2). Other courts establish specific procedures that a panel must follow in 
order to overrule a previous decision. For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a panel must 
circulate an opinion to the full court before overruling a previous Seventh Circuit opinion. 
Rule 40(e) states: 
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position which 
would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict between or among 
circuits shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the active 
members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the 
issue of whether the position should be adopted. 
See 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). And several federal circuit courts have adopted rules that establish 
disagreement with a previous decision in the same court as one of two or three bases for en 
banc review. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1)(B) (stating that a petition for rehearing en banc 
may be granted if the petition alleges that “the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to 
the conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure 
and maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions”); 3D CIR.  R. 35.1 (requiring en banc 
petitioner to state that: “I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional 
judgment, that the panel decision is contrary to decisions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”); 6TH CIR. R. 35(c) (“A 
suggestion for rehearing en banc is an extraordinary procedure which is intended to bring to 
the attention of the entire Court a precedent-setting error of exceptional public importance or 
an opinion which directly conflicts with prior Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit precedent.”); 
11TH CIR. R. 35-6(c) (requiring a similar statement); FED. CIR. R. 35(b)(2) (same). 
 91. Occasionally, courts have even adopted rules that encourage consistency among courts 
in different jurisdictions. For example, in the Seventh Circuit, before issuing an opinion that 
will create a split in the circuits on a substantive legal issue, a panel must circulate an opinion to 
the full court. 7TH CIR. R. 40(e) (requiring that any proposed panel opinion that would creat e a 
circuit split be circulated to the full court before publication). Similarly, several federal circuit 
courts have established rules that make a split in authority with a sister jurisdiction a basis for en 
banc review. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 35(b) (1) (B) (“[A] petition [for rehearing en banc] may 
assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on 
which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts 
of Appeals that have addressed the issue.”); FED. CIR. R. 35 (b) (1) (B) (same). 
 92. Some scholars claim that stare decisis strikes “with all the predictability of a lightning 
bolt,” Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 390 (1981), and that it 
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constitutes precedent in a particular case is a flexible concept that is subject 
to interpretation, especially when considering cases that are not directly on 
point.93 In practice, courts may interpret a prior decision in such a way that 
it does not appear to be controlling, even though a strong argument might 
be made that it is relevant and controlling precedent. Courts may also do 
the opposite, citing a preceding case as controlling or persuasive precedent 
when that case is arguably not relevant to the issue at hand.94 Furthermore, 
courts may intentionally emphasize some facts and deemphasize others to 
make a case appear controlling or not, depending on the desired result. As 
Dean Edward Levi observed, “the scope of a rule of law, and therefore its 
meaning, depends upon a determination of what facts will be considered 
similar to those present when the rule was first announced.”95 Determining 
similarity or difference is essential to the application of precedent and is 
solely the function of the court in the present case. Indeed, “the judge in the 
present case may find irrelevant the existence or absence of facts which prior 
judges thought important.”96 
Although the concept of precedent is flexible, it does have meaning 
and effect. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed, precedents “fix the point 
of departure from which the labor of the judge begins.”97 Courts remain, at 
least to some extent, constrained by previous decisions.98 The reasons for 
this are several-fold. First and most obviously, judges recognize that their 
 
is a “doctrine of convenience to both conservatives and liberals . . . [whose] friends . . . are 
determined by the needs of the moment.” Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and 
Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988); see also Max Radin, 
The Method of Law, 1950 WASH U. L.Q. 471, 484 (arguing that a major function of legal 
education is to teach law students to manipulate precedent). 
 93. The flexibility of precedent is often seen in cases where opposing parties each provide 
lines of precedent that they claim to be controlling, but which lead to opposite results. In such 
circumstances, the court may choose either line based solely on the desired result and, 
assuming the arguments made for each are at least plausible, remain entirely faithful to the 
principle of precedent. 
 94. Indeed, some legal realists have questioned whether precedents are simply smoke 
screens for judges’ political and personal preferences. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND 148-59 (1930). An empirical test of the influence of precedent on decisions of 
Supreme Court Justices—who are the least controlled by precedent due to their position at the 
pinnacle of the American legal system and the Supreme Court’s tendency to only accept cases 
for review that are not clearly controlled by its earlier decisions—indicates that they cited it at 
conference as an important element in their decision making process in a little over one 
quarter of cases. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 30 (1998). This 
suggests that precedent is, at least rhetorically, an important element in judicial decision 
making. 
 95. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 502 (1948) 
[hereinafter E. Levi, Introduction]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. CARDOZO, supra note 90, at 20. 
 98. See id. at 19-20. The exception to this general principle is, of course, the Supreme 
Court, which is constrained only inasmuch as it desires to be. 
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decisions may be overruled if they are too dismissive of prior precedent, thus 
depriving their decision of any legal effect.99 Judges also follow precedent to 
preserve their reputations and prestige.100 This may be a particularly strong 
incentive for a judge who wishes to be appointed to a higher court. 
Moreover, judges follow precedent because they know that if they regularly 
fail to do so, they risk treatment in kind by their fellow judges.101  
Yet judges are not simply constrained by precedent. They also benefit 
greatly from it and thus have reason to support its continued vitality.102 
Precedent binds future judges to respect the decisions of current judges, 
expanding the influence of current judges beyond cases in which they 
participate to cases that may arise long after they have left the bench. To be 
sure, there may be something of a collective action problem inherent in 
maintaining the principle of precedent.103 In any individual case, a judge 
 
 99. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 542 (4th ed. 1992) (“The judge 
who disregards precedent will be reversed by a higher court that has no interest in letting him 
impair the practice of decision according to precedent in order to magnify his own 
influence.”); Richard A. Posner, What do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 
SUP.  CT.  ECON. REV. 1, 13 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, What do Judges Maximize?] (including 
“popularity, prestige, and avoiding reversal” in a “judicial utility function”). 
 100. See Posner, What do Judges Maximize?, supra note 99, at 6 (1993) (finding that “a 
potentially significant element in the judicial utility function is reputation”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 101. For example, a lower court judge who regularly ignores the precedent set by a 
particular higher court might find her future decisions viewed more skeptically by that court. 
Similarly, a judge who is quick to dismiss the precedent set by a judge or panel on the same 
court may find other judges on that court treating her decisions with similar disrespect. 
 102. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 99, at 541 (“A precedent projects a judge’s influence more 
effectively than a decision that will have no effect in guiding future behavior. This . . . suggests 
why judges follow as well as make precedent . . . .”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the 
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 817 (1982) (“[E]ach Justice may find it advantageous to follow 
rules announced by his predecessors, so that successors will follow his rules in turn. Stare decisis 
thus enhances the power of the Justices.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 273 (1976) (suggesting that it 
is to judges’ advantage to follow precedent so that their successors do the same); Eric 
Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63 (1994) (using a game 
theoretic model to demonstrate that given the proper climate of expectations and norms of 
judicial behavior, even purely self-interested judges will follow precedent to maximize their own 
influence in the future). 
 103. The term “collective action problem” refers to the predicted underproduction of 
collective or public goods—goods that exhibit nonrivalry in consumption (i.e., when one 
individual’s consumption does not interfere with another’s) and nonexcludability (i.e., when it 
is either impossible or at least difficult to prevent any individual from enjoying the good once it 
is supplied). Collective action theory predicts that large groups will underprovide collective 
goods because each member of the group will refuse to pay his share of the costs of producing 
or providing the good (e.g., members will “defect” or “free ride”). See Joanne Gowa, Public Goods 
and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States, in THE STATE AND 
AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 20-21 (G. John Ikenberry et al. eds., 1988) (explaining 
collective action problem). See generally MANCUR OLSON ,  THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (discussing, in detail, the economic and 
“group theory” basis for the collective action problem). 
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receives the full benefits from defection but shares the costs of the harm to 
the principle of precedent with all other judges. But judges are arguably 
sufficiently “privileged actors”—their numbers are relatively small, 
particularly within each line of authority—that the collective action problem 
can be overcome.104 And, of course, there are individual costs of defection 
that make defection less attractive.105 
The rule of precedent also benefits judges by reducing their workload. 
Reliance upon precedent makes it possible for judges to put less labor into 
each individual case. As Justice Cardozo once remarked, “the labor of judges 
would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could 
be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of brick 
on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before 
him.”106 By relying on past decisions, judges can save significant time and 
effort and thereby consider far more cases than would otherwise be possible. 
Judges can turn to past analyses and avoid rethinking every aspect of a 
decision.107 Indeed, this may help explain why the Supreme Court, which 
generally considers cases that involve unsettled principles of law, resolves far 
fewer cases than lower courts that can often rely more heavily on 
precedent.108 Even at the Supreme Court level, however, not every issue 
raised by a case is considered anew. As Justice Powell once noted, “[f]ew 
cases that reach the Supreme Court are easy. Most involve hours of study 
and reflection; the conscientious judge must make many close calls. It 
 
 104. A “privileged” group or actor is a group “such that each of its members, or at least 
some of them, has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided, even if he has to bear 
the full burden of providing it himself.” OLSON, supra note 103, at 49-50. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101. 
 106. CARDOZO, supra note 90, at 149; see also RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM,  THE JUDICIAL 
DECISION:  TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 72-74 (1961) (detailing the efficiency 
justification for precedent); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 370 (1988) 
(“[T]he ability to rely on precedent no doubt simplifies the task of judging.”). 
 107. The use of precedent not only makes it possible  for judges to complete what might 
otherwise be an insurmountable amount of work, but it also allows them to do so relatively 
quickly, leaving time for leisure or other preferred pursuits. See Posner, What do Judges 
Maximize?, supra note 99, at 13 (observing that judges value leisure). 
 108. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 22 (1991) (noting that the Supreme Court 
takes a small proportion of the cases appealed to it); William T. Coleman, Jr., The Supreme Court 
of the United States: Managing Its Caseload to Achieve Its Constitutional Purposes, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1, 2-5 (1983) (suggesting that the Court’s caseload must be limited to allow the Court to fulfill 
its constitutional purposes and providing data on the number of opinions written by the United 
States Supreme Court); Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 1999 
Annual Report of the Director, tbl.A-1, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999.index.html (visited 
Oct. 16, 2000) (providing data on the judicial caseload of the United States Supreme Court and 
indicating that 90 cases were argued during the October 1998 term); id. at 16, at 
http://www.uscourts.gove/judbus1999.index.html (visited Oct. 16, 2000) (providing data on 
the judicial caseload for the United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts 
and indicating that 54,000 cases were filed in the United States Courts of Appeals in 1998, 
roughly 4,154 per court). 
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cannot be suggested seriously that every case brought to the Court should 
require reexamination on the merits of every relevant precedent.”109 The 
doctrine of stare decisis may also contribute to a lower volume of litigation, 
and thus a smaller workload for judges, as the legal certainty that it fosters 
leads more individuals to choose settlement over litigation.110  
Perhaps most important, judges conform to the doctrine of stare decisis 
because the principle of precedent is deeply ingrained in our Anglo-
American legal culture. Most lawyers in the United States have internalized 
the doctrine of stare decisis and obey it reflexively.111 They accept the 
principle that treating like cases alike is an important element of legal justice 
and necessary to the functioning of the legal system. Moreover, judges often 
follow a precedent for the simple but obvious reason that they find its 
reasoning compelling. Therefore although lawyers and judges are often 
eager to bend precedent to serve their ends, they generally do not wish to 
abandon it.  
Thus, although the doctrine of stare decisis is flexible, it does lead 
judges to look to previous decisions. The system of stare decisis thereby 
creates an explicitly path-dependent process in which later decisions rely on, 
and are constrained by, earlier decisions. More specifically, as I argue below, 
the legal structure of the common law system generates increasing returns, 
evolutionary, and sequencing path dependence. These three types of path 
dependence operate concurrently, with varying degrees of prominence, 
depending on the area of law and specific legal issue. By examining these 
specific path-dependent features and their consequences, we can gain 
greater insight into how our legal process works and how our legal structure 
has shaped, and continues to shape, legal outcomes. 
A. INCREASING RETURNS PATH DEPENDENCE 
Perhaps the most obvious and striking path-dependent features of the 
common law system are those that fall under the rubric of increasing returns 
path dependence. Increasing returns in a common law system derive directly 
from reliance upon precedent. The common law system operates through 
the gradual building of legal rules upon one another over time. Not only 
does an earlier decision influence the later decisions of courts, but it also 
influences them in a particular way: It makes it more likely that courts will 
choose to resolve similar legal dilemmas in a similar manner. In the process 
 
 109. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 62 N.Y. ST. B.J. 15, 18 (July 1990). 
 110. POSNER, supra note 99, at 542. Once an issue is settled by a court, parties with similar 
legal disputes have a preview of the likely result of their own case and a consequent incentive to 
settle the issue without incurring the costs of litigation. 
 111. Indeed, much of legal education is based on the notion of stare decisis, therefore 
lawyers-in-training are necessarily exposed to the arguments in favor of stare decisis implicitly, if 
not explicitly. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments made in favor 
of stare decisis); infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text (same). 
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of accretion, “there is a tendency toward the reproduction of kind. Every 
judgment has a generative power. It begets in its own image.”112 Every 
precedent “has ‘a directive force for future cases of the same or similar 
nature.’”113 Thus, each step taken in one direction increases the likelihood 
of additional steps in that same direction. 
Other factors reinforce the increasing returns nature of the common 
law system in addition to the formal doctrine of stare decisis. For instance, 
the process of judging generates significant learning effects.114 Judges 
accumulate experience and knowledge over time. Inevitably, they see similar 
issues raised repeatedly. A judge may draw on earlier analogous cases in 
deciding later cases even if they do not strictly constitute a binding or 
persuasive precedent. For example, a judge may rely on a case that decides 
an issue in dicta or in a dissimilar factual situation and thus does not 
constitute formally binding precedent. While not bound to follow the case 
by any rule of precedent, the judge may nonetheless draw on the insights 
and knowledge gained from such cases. 
The common law system also generates significant self-reinforcing or 
adaptive expectations. Litigants are unlikely to make arguments that stray 
from existing law (as created, shaped, and revealed by prior precedent), 
because they know that doing so would significantly decrease their 
likelihood of success and perhaps even risk sanctions for putting forward an 
argument with an insufficient legal basis.115 Thus litigants bring suits that are 
factually consistent with previous cases and make arguments within the 
bounds of existing precedent and law. Consequently, when a new precedent 
emerges, litigants will react to the precedent in ways that further reinforce 
and contribute to the path indicated by that new precedent: Parties whose 
favored outcomes become more likely in the wake of the new precedent may 
be more likely to bring suit and thereby push the law further in that same 
direction, whereas parties whose desired outcomes become less likely may be 
discouraged from engaging in litigation, allowing the new path to continue 
unchecked. Dean Levi observes this dynamic arising out of statutory 
decisions. He argues that private conduct, future interpretations, and 
legislative activity all rely and build upon statutory decisions by the courts.116 
Consequently, courts try cases and hear arguments that are directly shaped 
 
 112. Powell, supra note 109, at 21. 
 113. CARDOZO, supra note 90, at 22 (quoting Redlich, The Case Method in American Law 
Schools, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION, BULLETIN NO. 8, at 37). 
 114. See id . at 19 (“The first thing [a judge does when presented with a case] is to compare 
the case before him with the precedents, whether stored in his mind or hidden in the books.”). 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), for instance, permits sanctions to be levied against a person if 
that person violates its provision requiring that “the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions” in any pleading, written motion, or other paper presented to the court “are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” 
 116. See E. Levi, Introduction, supra note 95, at 523-40. 
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by the courts’ prior decisions. 
The increasing returns path-dependent nature of the common law 
system is further reinforced by the difficulties of foresight or the “bounded 
rationality” of the courts.117 The principles of justice require judges to 
consider each case independently.118 But even when judges consider future 
cases, they cannot possibly predict all possible future cases and construct 
decisions that would have the optimal effect on them. This is not to say that 
judges do not (or perhaps even should not) bear in mind the possible 
ramifications of their current decisions on future cases or that judges are not 
“rational” in the ordinary sense of that word.119 Rather, it simply means that 
judges possess less than complete information regarding the set of future 
cases and the impact of a particular decision on those future cases.120 
Consequently, even when judges seek to create legal rules to advance their 
positions in the future, they are unable to predict or control whether their 
decisions will create precedents that will necessarily lead to particular results 
in future cases. 
The conclusion that the common law system exhibits increasing returns 
path dependence helps to explain and predict the way the system will 
operate. Indeed, the increasing returns nature of the common law system 
has three predictable consequences. The first is nonergodicity—small early 
events have a large impact on the eventual outcome. Because judges cannot 
fully anticipate the ways in which public and private actors will react to their 
decisions, they have difficulty determining the likely effect of their decisions 
over time. For this reason, decisions may have large, unanticipated, and 
unintended effects. For example, a single sentence in an early case may take 
on increasing significance over time. When a higher court makes a 
statement, even in dicta, on a previously undecided or unclear issue, litigants 
and lower courts often rely upon that statement for guidance. The statement 
may become the decisive factor in future lower court decisions and even in 
 
 117. The term “bounded rationality,” as used in political economy literature, refers to the 
fact that actors often must act upon imperfect or incomplete information. For more on 
bounded rationality, see HERBERT A. SIMON , MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (1982). 
 118. But see Fredrerick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 588-91 (1987) (discussing 
how judges take into account the expected effect of a case on future cases when making a 
decision under a legal system where precedent is binding). 
 119. It also does not suggest that judges do not engage in forward thinking in other 
contexts. For example, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight argue quite persuasively that members of 
the Supreme Court take into account the likely preferences of their colleagues and the actions 
they expect them to take at the merits stage, as well as the likely reactions of other political 
actors, when deciding how to vote on certiorari petitions. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 94, 
at 79-88; see also PERRY, supra note 108, at 198-212 (describing Supreme Court Justices’ use of 
“defensive denials” and “aggressive grants” in the certiorari process). 
 120. Even the Supreme Court, which has more control over its docket than any other court 
in the United States, cannot determine when petitions for certiorari will be filed and, therefore, 
cannot control or predict what cases will be in the pool of cases with which it will be presented. 
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future cases in the same court. Indeed, some judges, understanding this, 
might even engage in strategic opinion writing—placing unnecessary 
statements in opinions (which are likely to go unnoticed and therefore 
unchallenged by fellow judges) to be used by litigants, lower courts, and the 
judges themselves in subsequent cases. Indeed, one of Justice Stone’s law 
clerks reported that Justice Stone would consciously “plant[] seeds of new 
concepts in the dicta of his writing . . . ‘like a squirrel storing nuts to be 
pulled out at some later time.’”121 
The nonergodicity of the common law system makes early cases on a 
legal issue dramatically important. Because the path of the common law is 
locked in at an early stage, early decisions are crucial to the direction of the 
law. The first few cases that address a new legal issue frame the law for all 
future cases raising the same or a similar issue. Path dependence theory thus 
lends a theoretical grounding to the efforts by legal advocacy groups to 
control and choose cases that raise novel issues. 
An example will help clarify this insight. A single (now very famous) 
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products,122 an opinion issued by the 
Supreme Court during the New Deal period, is widely regarded as having set 
the stage for the Warren Court’s assumption of an active role in monitoring 
the political institutions of the country.123 The footnote suggested that the 
Court would apply different degrees of judicial scrutiny to different types of 
legislation: The Court might lessen the presumption of constitutionality 
“where legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of 
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments”; apply greater 
scrutiny in reviewing “legislation which restricts those political processes 
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation”; and discount the presumption of constitutionality for “statutes 
directed at particular religious . . . or . . . national . . . or racial minorities.”124 
Much of the following six decades of Supreme Court case law has been 
devoted to expanding and specifying the extent to which this suggestion 
would be implemented. This case thus demonstrates well that small causes 
can have large effects.125 
 
 121. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 203 (1964). 
 122. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 123. See id. at 152 n.4; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at  128-29 (stating that the footnote was an 
effort to reorient the meaning of the reconstruction amendments in the post-New Deal world); 
ELY, supra note 3, at 75-77 (explaining that the footnote foreshadowed the Warren Court’s 
assumption of a more “activist” or interventionist role). 
 124. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 125. A much less prominent example of this phenomenon, but one that indicates its 
frequency, can be found in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), and S-1 & S-2 v. State Board of 
Education, 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994). In Farrar, the Supreme Court held that the court below 
had erred in holding that petitioners’ nominal damages award had failed to render them 
prevailing parties. In the course of its opinion, it explained that, “No material alteration of the 
legal relationship between parties occurs until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a 
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The second predictable consequence of increasing returns path 
dependence in the common law is lock-in or inflexibility. Once a court has 
resolved a legal issue in a particular way, the doctrine of stare decisis and 
more informal characteristics of the common law system lock in the legal 
rule. The principle of stare decisis locks courts into conforming their future 
decisions to the bounds set by binding precedent. Moreover, while a court 
may not be strictly bound by its own decision, it is unlikely to diverge from it. 
And courts in concurrent jurisdictions, though not bound by the decision, 
may look to it as persuasive precedent—as not strictly binding but lending 
credence and weight to a party’s arguments on a similar legal issue. These 
characteristics of the common law process lead a particular resolution of a 
legal issue to become locked in; courts find it increasingly difficult to depart 
from the path once the first few steps are taken. 
Lock-in or inflexibility can, in turn, lead to inefficiency. Early decisions 
may lead to formation of a legal rule that becomes increasingly inefficient 
over time. This is true regardless of whether the early decisions are 
themselves efficient. External circumstances may change, causing what was 
once an efficient rule to become inefficient in light of the changed context. 
Or what is an efficient rule in one case may be much less efficient in a 
somewhat different context. Or new information may become available that 
changes the perception of the legal issue and its correct resolution. Or, 
finally, courts may take what was an efficient rule in a narrow set of 
circumstances and broaden it to encompass a set of circumstances in which 
it is less efficient. 
This implication of path dependence runs directly counter to a 
significant body of legal scholarship on the efficiency of the common law. 
Since the 1970s, many scholars subscribing to the law and economics school 
of thought have glorified the common law on efficiency grounds. As I show 
in greater detail below, these scholars argue that the common law evolves 
toward efficient rules for a variety of reasons, including judges’ propensity to 
favor efficient rules, the greater likelihood that inefficient rules will be 
litigated, and the greater frequency of court settlement in cases in which the 
legal rules relevant to the dispute are inefficient.126 The law and economics 
 
judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. Based 
on this brief statement, arguably made in dicta, the Fourth Circuit later concluded in an 
unrelated case that a party could not be considered a prevailing party, and thus eligible for 
attorney’s fees, unless it had obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement 
giving some legal relief. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51. In the course of so concluding, the Fourth 
Circuit overruled a line of cases in that circuit that had held that where a lawsuit operates as a 
“catalyst” for post-litigation changes in a defendant’s conduct, that was sufficient to establish 
plaintiff as a prevailing party. Id. Thus, one sentence in a Supreme Court decision was 
transformed by a lower court into not only a basis for deciding a case but also a ground for 
overruling a longstanding line of precedent. 
 126. See infra text accompanying notes 144-51 (summarizing the argument that the most 
efficient legal rules tend to evolve in a common law legal system). 
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account of the common law fails to consider, however, the path-dependent 
nature of case law development.127 
The anticipatory reactions of potential litigants may amplify these 
inefficiencies. Rather than litigate a case that would lead to the most 
efficient rule, a party may be discouraged by what it perceives to be a clear 
trend in the case law against its position and thus decide to settle. At the 
same time, parties that favor an inefficient rule may seek to push the courts 
to extend its logic further, leading to even more inefficient legal outcomes. 
Consequently, the courts have fewer opportunities to consider returning to a 
more efficient rule and may even be pushed by litigants to extend an 
inefficient legal rule. This process may lead to the legal equivalent of the 
Qwerty keyboard: a legal rule that has become locked in early and that 
persists despite its inefficiency. An example of this phenomenon can be 
found in the courts’ recent struggles to apply patent rules first developed 
two centuries ago to newly emerging computer technology.128 
 
 127. The efficiency argument has been critiqued on other grounds. See generally Robert 
Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 139 (1980) (putting forward an “impossibility theorem,” which states that blind evolution 
will not cause the legal system to reach the best state or continually to improve itself); Robert 
Cooter et al., Liability Rules, Limited Information and the Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366 
(1979) (showing that judges have enough information to revise the legal standard for 
distributing accident costs via the mechanism of precedent so that the standard adopted tends 
toward efficiency); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 351 (1978) (examining the operation of private judicial systems); Sinclair, supra 
note 6 (providing a critical review of the use of evolutionary theory in the law); R. Peter 
Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981) 
(borrowing tools of evolutionary analysis from biology to test the proposition that inefficient 
legal rules are litigated more frequently than efficient ones); Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 
92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983) (arguing that the accumulation of precedent under a common law 
system will systematically favor inefficient, rather than efficient, legal rules). 
 128.  
[D]espite numerous technological advances in the past century, the statutory 
language of the Patent Act  . . . pertaining to patentable subject matter has not 
changed significantly since the inception of the Act over 200 years ago. Without 
current legislative guidance, courts and administrative agencies, including the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office  . . . have the difficult job of applying 
antiquated laws to cutting-edge technology, resulting in a confusing legal 
landscape. 
Christopher S. Cantzler, State Street: Leading the Way to Consistency for Patentability of Computer 
Software, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 423, 424 (2000). 
The statutory language used to define patentable subject matter in the United 
States has not changed significantly since it was first developed over 200 years 
ago. . . . [W]here law-making bodies do not act, courts and administrative agencies, 
such as the Patent and Trademark Office, are left with the difficult task of applying 
antiquated laws to new technologies. Often, this procedure is analogous to fitting a 
square peg into a round hole . . . . One area in which courts have been faced with 
unforeseen scientific advances is in the field of computer-related inventions. 
Peter Weissman, Computer Software as Patentable Subject Matter, 23 AIPLA Q. J. 525, 527 (1995). 
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The third consequence of the common law system’s increasing returns 
feature is indeterminacy of outcome (or, as game theorists put it, multiple 
equilibria). Indeterminacy arises from “randomness” or unpredictability in 
the initial selection of the legal rule. That is not to say that the decision 
making process is random. Instead, randomness occurs because specific 
facts, circumstances, and legal arguments vary significantly from case to case. 
Every case that raises a new legal issue will necessarily involve a unique 
combination of these qualities. Moreover, cases will differ because of 
variation in the experiences and beliefs of the judge or judges.129 
Thus, the early cases in a line of case law are unpredictable for the same 
reason that the first firm’s decision to locate in a particular region is 
unpredictable: Each depends on a unique set of inherently unpredictable 
factors. And just as that initial unpredictable event has important 
consequences for the geographical location of industry, the early 
unpredictable cases on a legal issue have important consequences for the 
development of the case law on that issue. To the extent that we are unable 
to predict the early cases that will present a legal issue, we are equally unable 
to predict where these initial cases will lead.130 
The conclusion that legal results are unpredictable does not mean, of 
course, that they are inexplicable.131 Looking backward, one may be able to 
trace the path of reasonable decisions that led to the current rule. Nor does 
the unpredictability of legal outcomes imply that they are random or that 
the range of possible outcomes is limitless. Rather, the possible equilibria 
may be highly constrained. Which of the possible equilibria will ultimately 
prevail depends on a number of factors, some of which are unpredictable. 
One might object to the claim that there are multiple possible 
outcomes and argue that there is usually (or at least often) one correct 
result in the law. Yet the observation that the outcome is indeterminate is 
descriptive, not normative. That is, it may be true that there is one correct 
legal rule as a normative matter. But, as a descriptive matter, multiple 
 
 129. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Symposium on Post-Chicago Law and Economics: An Economic 
Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1989) (suggesting that different 
judges may have different values, which may in turn affect their decisions). 
 130. Indeed, even rights now viewed as fundamental have been described by members of 
the Supreme Court as arising out of “historical accidents.” For example, Justice Powell makes a 
convincing argument that the rule that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial at the moment the jury 
is sworn is “the product of historical accident.” See Crist v. L.R. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 40 (1978) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Court has held that the federal requirement of a 
unanimous verdict by twelve jurors was a result of historical accident. See Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 88-90 (1970) (“In short, while sometime in the 14th century the size of the jury at 
common law came to be fixed generally at 12, that particular feature of the jury system appears 
to have been a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in 
the first place.”). 
 131. See Jacob S. Hacker, Learning from Defeat?: Political Analysis and the Failure of Health Care 
Reform in the United States, BRIT. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming Jan. 2001) (discussing further the 
distinction between predictability and explainability). 
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outcomes are almost always possible. Moreover, when it comes to cases that 
make it to court, the “right” legal rule is often a matter of interpretation; 
cases in which the result is abundantly clear generally are settled long before 
they arrive in the courtroom. Indeed, if the correct legal result were always 
clear, there would be little need for courts at all. 
The well-known story of the emergence of the vexing Rule against 
Perpetuities provides a compelling example of the common law’s increasing 
returns path dependence.132 In mid-seventeenth-century England, there was 
an ongoing battle between landowners and the courts over rules of 
inheritance. Landowners sought greater control over the passage of their 
lands, and the courts stood firm against them. In 1681, the Earl of Arundel 
sought to create trust indentures to prevent his land from passing to his 
insane eldest son. Lord Chancellor Nottingham recognized the Earl’s 
concern as legitimate and developed a ruling to reflect his specific 
circumstances. The Lord Chancellor reasoned that the father could 
reasonably assess his living family members’ capabilities and thus permitted 
the father’s judgment to be enforced. Over the next 150 years, this ruling 
gradually grew into the well-known Rule against Perpetuities, under which 
“[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one 
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”133 
The development of the Rule against Perpetuities demonstrates each of 
the above-described properties of increasing returns path dependence in 
the law. First, the development of the Rule was nonergodic: A small early 
event—a father seeking to withhold inheritance of his land from his insane 
son—had a large impact on the eventual outcome. The principle that 
landowners should be able to decide among the persons whom they are in a 
position to judge in granting inheritance rights became locked into what 
now appears to be a peculiar standard. Second, the result was unpredictable: 
Although we can explain quite easily how the rule developed, the final 
outcome would have been difficult, if not impossible, to predict in advance. 
Third, there is nothing inherent in the Rule against Perpetuities that leads 
us to believe that it was the unique equilibrium. Rather, any number of 
possible rules governing inheritance could have developed given a different 
set of historical circumstances. The famous rule, which has vexed students of 
property law for over a century, thus illustrates nicely the consequences of 
 
 132. This example draws from JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 299-300 (3d 
ed. 1993). 
 133. JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942). Of course, the 
Rule against Perpetuities has been revoked or modified by statute in several jurisdictions. See 
Sanford J. Schlesinger & Dana L. Mark, Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Continues to Evolve and 
May Pose Traps and Pitfalls for the Unwary, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 43, 49 (1999) (“The rule against 
perpetuities has been repealed in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, New 
Jersey, South Dakota and Wisconsin, and thus a trust established in any of these jurisdictions 
can virt ually continue indefinitely.”). 
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increasing returns path dependence in the common law. 
B. EVOLUTIONARY PATH DEPENDENCE 
Of the three path dependence models discussed here, evolutionary 
theory has been invoked most frequently in the legal literature. Indeed, the 
language used to describe the common law process often draws on 
evolutionary metaphors. The Supreme Court has written that the “flexibility 
and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence 
of the common law” and that “the common law is not immutable but 
flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”134 This 
language reflects an underlying reality. In a common law system, the 
decision in each new case draws on the stock of existing precedent, and that 
new case forms the foundation of precedent on which future cases are 
based. As Justice Cardozo once explained: 
The implications of a decision may in the beginning be equivocal. 
New cases by commentary and exposition extract the essence. At 
last there emerges a rule or principle which becomes a datum, a 
point of departure, from which new lines will be run, from which 
new courses will be measured. Sometimes the rule or principle is 
found to have been formulated too narrowly or broadly, and has to 
be reframed. Sometimes it is accepted as a postulate of later 
reasoning, its origins are forgotten, it becomes a new stock of 
descent, its issue unite with other strains, and persisting permeate 
the law.135 
Evolutionary theory enjoys a long lineage in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.136 It first emerged in legal literature in the nineteenth-
century German historical school of jurisprudence, which was founded in 
the early 1800s by Gustav von Hugo and continued by Freidrich Karl von 
Savigny.137 Scholars took it up with renewed vigor in the wake of the 
 
 134. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1933). A federal district court similarly 
noted: 
The genius of the common law is its flexibility and capacity for growth and 
adaptation. It has always been recognized that the common law is not a rigid, 
inflexible, static thing, but is a living organism, ever growing and expanding to 
meet the problems and needs of changing social and economic conditions. The 
common law is not a primer of rigid and absolute rules, but rather a body of broad 
and comprehensive principles created by judicial decisions and based on justice, 
reason, and common sense. Its principles have been determined by the needs of 
society and are ever susceptible to adaptation to new conditions, relations, and 
usages, as the progress of civilization may require. 
Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 285-86 (W.D. Mich. 1949) (citations omitted). 
 135. CARDOZO, supra note 90, at 48-49. 
 136. See supra note 6 (citing some major works on legal evolution). 
 137. See generally FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY,  OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR 
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publication of Darwin’s On The Origin of Species .138 In 1861, Sir Henry James 
Sumner Maine, for example, identified successive stages through which 
“progressive societies” must pass,139 and John Henry Wigmore developed a 
comprehensive theory of legal evolution in the early 1900s.140 These early 
works were followed by the scholarship of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who took 
legal evolutionary theory to the level of legal doctrine. In perhaps the most 
famous statement of his views on the topic, Holmes wrote: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The 
felt necessities of time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the 
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a 
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules 
by which men should be governed.141 
Drawing and building upon Holmes’s insights, Arthur Linton Corbin142 and 
Robert Charles Clark143 set the stage for the economic theory of legal 
evolution that gained acceptance in the legal literature of the early 1970s 
and remains the most influential variant of legal evolutionary theory today. 
 
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE  (1831) (exemplifying the tradition of the German historical 
school); 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ,  AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 144 
(Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 2d rev. ed. 1987) (1969) (same). Von Savigny’s, Maine’s, 
and Wigmore’s works are examples of an early variant of legal evolutionary theory that Elliott 
terms “social theories of legal evolution.” Elliott, Evolutionary Tradition, supra note 6, at 40. This 
variant is characterized by the view of the law as changing and “adapting” over time in response 
to changes in society, rather than as static or autonomous. It posed an alternative to the 
positivist conception of law and focused attention on the influence of social and cultural factors 
on the law. Although some of its insights continue to undergird much of modern legal 
evolutionary work, few modern legal scholars continue to adhere to this view of legal evolution, 
which is poorly defined in comparison with more modern variants of legal evolutionary theory. 
 138. DARWIN, supra note 7. 
 139. See generally SIR HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE 
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (1861). 
 140. See generally EVOLUTION OF LAW: SELECT READINGS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (John Henry Wigmore & Alber Kocourek eds., 1915-1918) (3 vols.). 
 141. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 1. 
 142. Arthur Linton Corbin argued in 1914 that “[a] judge’s declared rules must compete 
for their lives with the rules declared by other judges and by all other persons. In the judicial 
world, as in the animal and vegetable world, the ultimate law is the law of the surv ival of the 
fittest.” Arthur Linton Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234, 238 (1914). 
 143. Summarizing six examples of legal evolution in corporate and commercial law, Robert 
Charles Clark argued that in each there was a general pattern of evolution toward cost 
reduction. See Robert Charles Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 
1238, 1241, 1250-54 (1981) [hereinafter Clark, Interdisciplinary Study] (focusing primarily on the 
evolution of corporate organizations and institutions). Clark was also the first to extend legal 
evolutionary theory to include statutes. See generally Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of 
Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977); see also Robert 
Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 561, 561 (1981) (identifying and analyzing a “long-term pattern of changes in the 
institutional arrangements for aggregating and channeling capital in our private economy”). 
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Modern scholars in the law and economics tradition draw on the 
evolutionary model to argue that competition leads to the best (most 
efficient) legal rule.144 In what has been termed the “classical evolutionary 
paradigm,”145 the rule that survives the whittling process of the common law 
is presumptively efficient, for if it were not, it would be challenged and 
replaced by more efficient competitors.146 In this view, the common law 
evolves toward efficient rules because, inter alia, judges favor efficient 
rules,147 inefficient rules are litigated more often than efficient ones,148 
 
 144.  For example, see WILLIAM M. LANDES &  RICHARD A. POSNER,  THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (analyzing the efficiency theory and its relationship to tort 
law), and infra text accompanying notes 147-50 (citing factors that law and economic scholars 
claim lead to the evolution of efficient common law rules). For a brief summary of this 
literature, see POSNER, supra note 99, at 2. One prominent exception to this tendency among 
modern scholarship is Mark Roe’s article, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, supra note 
12, which has caused some scholars to rethink the validity of the classical evolution-to-efficiency 
paradigm in describing the process of change in business and legal institutions. But Roe’s work 
focuses primarily on the evolution of corporate structures and corporate governance and does 
not examine or challenge the validity of the theory in the common law context. A few other 
scholars have also noted instances of the panda’s thumb effect in the law. See David, supra note 
12, at 19 (noting parallels between the panda’s thumb effect and the development of 
intelle ctual property institutions). 
 145. Roe, supra note 12, at 641. 
 146. Legal scholars, of course, are far from alone in applying the evolutionary paradigm 
outside biology. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS 7-8, 54-56 
(1989) (summarizing and critiquing social science works that advance the hypothesis that 
history leads to efficient rules and institutions); Richard R. Nelson, Evolutionary Theorizing 
About Economic Change (Apr. 13, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(reviewing the use of evolutionary analysis in economics and other social sciences). Assuming 
that each environment produces an equilibrium that is both unique and optimal, economic, 
political, and sociological theorists have argued that competition for scarce resources leads to 
differential survival of the most optimal firms, institutions, or rules. See MARCH & OLSEN, supra, 
at 54-55 (summarizing arguments of such theorists). Indeed, economists used the evolutionary 
paradigm to support the conclusions of neoclassical equilibrium theory as early as the 1950s. 
Nelson, supra, at 3. In one of the earliest examples of this work, Armen A. Alchian argued for an 
approach to economic theory that interpreted the economic system as an “adoptive mechanism 
which chooses among exploratory actions generated by the adaptive pursuit of ‘success’ or 
‘profits.’” Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON . 211, 
211 (1950); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 795 (1972) (suggesting that the firm is “a device 
for enchancing [sic] competition among sets of input resources as well as a device for more 
efficiently rewarding the inputs”). 
 147. See POSNER, supra note 99, at 534-36; George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the 
Selection of Efficient Rules , 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). 
 148. See POSNER, supra note 99, at 559 (arguing that, due to differential rates of litigation, 
“over time, there will be a tendency for less efficient rules to be weeded out and replaced by 
efficient ones, because efficient rules are less likely to be reexamined and hence less likely, once 
adopted, to be discarded in the future”). See generally Priest, supra note 147 (arguing that the 
joint benefits of changing the law are higher when the law is inefficient, therefore inefficient 
laws will be litigated more frequently than efficient laws and the common law will evolve toward 
efficiency); Terrebonne, supra note 127 (using the tools of evolutionary analysis to test and 
verify the proposition that inefficient legal rules are litigated more frequently than efficient 
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litigants advocating efficient rules have greater incentives than those 
advocating inefficient rules to incur legal expenses that increase the 
likelihood of a favorable decision,149 and resorting to court settlement is 
more likely in cases in which the legal rules governing the dispute are 
inefficient.150 In essence, the model of the common law adopted by many 
scholars is a legal version of the Darwinian paradigm.151 
As discussed above, path dependence theory casts doubt on the claims 
of those who argue that the evolution of the common law leads to the most 
efficient legal rule. The evolution-to-efficiency argument ignores the path-
dependent nature of legal change in a common law system. It fails to 
recognize that each choice is made within a constrained set of 
circumstances. A court is not always free to choose the legal rule that it 
believes to be the most efficient, even if it were inclined to do so. Stare 
decisis and its attendant rules of respect for precedent often prevent it from 
doing so. Just as the species in existence today are not perfect, but rather the 
best nature could do given the limited options left to it by history, so too are 
current legal rules the result of historical processes that significantly 
constrain the available options and, hence, the possibilities for evolution-to-
efficiency. 
Indeed, it appears that modern scholars largely fail to notice the 
nuances in evolutionary theory that led Holmes to some of his most 
intriguing insights. Holmes not only drew explicit comparisons between 
 
ones). But see generally Note, supra note 127 (arguing that more “reckless” rules are more likely 
to be litigated and thus more likely to develop precedent favorable to their replication, thereby 
squeezing out less reckless rules). Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser offer a corrective to the 
selective litigation theory. They assume that inefficient rules are selectively relitigated but that 
judges have no insight into which rules are better. They conclude that under these 
circumstances the evolutionary forces in the law will not lead to a single efficient rule, but 
instead to an “equilibrium” in which both the best and worst legal rules will recur. See Cooter & 
Kornhauser, supra note 127 (discussing the “impossibility theorem”); see also Robert D. Cooter & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 
1067, 1092 (1989) (“Does litigation tend to select inefficient laws? Theory suggests a weak 
‘Yes.’”). 
 149. See generally John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978) (arguing that even if the likelihood of litigation of efficient and 
inefficient rules is similar, the legal system will contain more efficient laws than inefficient laws 
because parties who stand to benefit from an efficient rule will invest more in litigation —and 
will consequently have a higher probability of winning—than do those who favor an inefficient 
rule). 
 150. See generally Paul Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). 
But see Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 145 (arguing that evolutionary pressures arising 
from settlement decisions by litigants “are insufficient to cause the legal system to adopt and 
retain the best legal rule without the help of judges”); cf. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 148, at 
1089-91 (offering a corrective to the “early studies” suggesting that settlement incentives lead to 
efficient le gal rules, but affirming their basic conclusion that differential settlement incentives 
can generate efficient legal rules). 
 151. See Clark, Interdisciplinary Study, supra note 143, at 1241 (suggesting that the process of 
legal change might be analogized to “Darwin’s natural-selection view of the origin of species”). 
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biological and legal evolution, but he also noted their tendency to retain 
vestiges of the past. Holmes wrote, “[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells 
of the existence of some earlier creature to which a collar-bone was useful, 
precedents survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end 
and the reason for them has been forgotten.”152 He was critical of rules that 
persist “for no better reason . . . than that . . . [they were] laid down in the 
time of Henry IV,” and even more critical of a rule “the grounds upon which 
it was laid down have vanished long since, and [which] simply persists from 
blind imitation of the past.”153 When rules are followed only because of 
tradition, he argued, irrational law may result.154 Thus the venerable 
Holmes, to whose work modern legal evolutionary literature can be traced, 
observed that legal evolution—far from always leading to efficient 
outcomes—may instead lead to inefficient and irrational results when legal 
precedent or tradition holds sway. 
As Holmes’s observations indicate, not only are the claims of evolution-
to-efficiency in the common law inaccurate as a descriptive matter, but they 
are also based on a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. Traditional 
evolutionary theory does not support the teleology often ascribed to it. The 
claim that the “fittest” will survive the natural selection process does not 
suggest that they are objectively “perfect.”155 Rather, “survival of the fittest” 
simply indicates that natural selection favors those animals that are most 
successful at reproducing in a given environment (which of course requires 
that they possess qualities that allow them not only to reproduce successfully 
but also to survive to an age at which they can reproduce). If a characteristic 
neither aids nor hinders reproductive success, then it may remain or 
disappear with no consequence. Moreover, imperfect characteristics that 
work reasonably well, like the panda’s thumb, may survive the process of 
natural selection. Therefore, the outcome of natural selection is not 
perfection, but is instead a series of progressive adaptations that lead to 
differential reproductive success. This is as much true in the law as in 
biology: Legal equivalents of the imperfect panda’s thumb—vestiges of a 
legal rule’s past—remain throughout the legal system. 
Scholars in the new institutionalism genre of political science examine 
the way in which political institutions evolve over time. They have concluded 
that the common claim that historical processes lead inexorably toward 
efficiency is faulty, both empirically and theoretically.156 They point out that 
 
 152. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 35. 
 153. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 187. 
 154. Id. at 187-94. 
 155. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (elaborating on the argument that 
biological evolution does not lead to a perfect outcome). 
 156. The “new institutionalism” or “historical institutionalism” literature argues that 
political struggles “are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take place.” G. John 
Ikenberry, Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy, in THE STATE 
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extensive periods of adjustment may be required during which “diverse, 
conflicting, and inefficient solutions survive.”157 An equilibrium—a single 
efficient outcome—may not exist. Even if one does exist, the adaptive rate of 
historical processes may proceed more slowly than changes in the 
environment, leading to a perpetual lag and, therefore, perpetual disparity 
between the institution or rule and its environment. Institutions are often 
resistant to change: They embed routines in a structure, develop their own 
criteria of appropriateness and success, and socialize existing 
arrangements.158 
The same phenomenon occurs in the law. When the rate of change in 
the legal environment outpaces the adaptation of legal rules, equilibrium is 
unlikely to be achieved before the environment changes. Because the legal 
environment is no more stable or static than the biological or political one, 
there will often be some degree of mismatch between the legal rule and the 
environment in which it is applied. This “mismatch” between the rate of 
adaptation and the rate of change in the environment is perhaps even more 
pronounced in legal institutions than in any other institution. The rule of 
stare decisis and the life tenure of most judges are, in fact, designed to 
embed resistance to change in the common law system. Indeed, many legal 
scholars celebrate this very quality of the legal system. Bruce Ackerman, for 
example, argues that the courts serve an essential “preservationist 
function . . . protecting the hard-won principles of a mobilized citizenry 
against erosion by political elites who have failed to gain broad and deep 
popular support for their innovations.”159 The law’s failure to adapt quickly 
may lead to inefficiency, but it also protects against instability and immediate 
surrender to momentary and ill-conceived whims of the public. This is where 
the biological and legal analogies diverge perhaps most significantly: 
Animals are largely powerless to preserve themselves in the face of marked 
changes in their environment, but judges, litigants, and institutions are 
capable of perpetuating legal rules long after the conditions that gave rise to 
them disappear. 
New evolutionary theory also offers some useful insights into the path-
dependent nature of the common law. As with the evolution of species, the 
 
AND AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 222-23 (G. John Ikenberry et al. eds., 1988). It 
“stresses that many of the contemporary implications of . . . temporal processes are embedded 
in institutions—whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or norms.” Paul Pierson, The 
Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, 29 COMP.  POL. STUD. 123, 126 
(1996). For more on the emergence of “new institutionalism,” see Ira Katz Nelson, Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1-32 (Sven Steinmo & Kathleen Thelen eds., 1992). 
 157. MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 146, at 55. 
 158. For example, the positions of political parties may change more slowly than voter 
preferences, thus rendering equilibrium between voter preferences and party position 
impossible to achieve. Id. 
 159. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 10. 
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evolution of the common law occurs sporadically. Long periods of stasis are 
followed by rapid change. The rapid change, or “punctuation,” can be 
brought about by a number of sources: higher court opinions that overrule 
or significantly alter existing legal rules; reconsideration of legal rules by the 
courts in which they were first established; new legislation; introduction of a 
novel legal issue; or, on rare occasions, constitutional amendments.160 For 
example, in perhaps the most common “punctuation” in the common law, a 
line of cases develops in a lower court, coalescing around a particular 
resolution of a legal issue. When a case from that line is appealed to the next 
higher court, however, the higher court may either adopt the lower court’s 
resolution of the legal issue, modify it, or reject it entirely. The review of the 
case by the higher court is therefore a punctuation in the legal model, just as 
an alteration in environmental conditions is a punctuation in the biological 
model. As in the biological sphere, the punctuation—the imposition of a 
new or modified resolution of a legal issue—is followed by a period of 
equilibrium during which courts follow the new legal rule, exploring its 
bounds and applying it to new circumstances but remaining true to its 
central requirements. 
Unlike biological evolution, legal evolution is not always constrained to 
draw on the existing stock of material during periods of rapid change. A 
higher court may create a new legal rule that departs significantly from the 
past rule, though it will remain constrained to some extent by its own 
precedents and by the decisions of any higher court. In this sense, legal 
evolution bears more similarity to political and institutional change as 
described by the “critical junctures” model,161 which focuses on periods of 
state-building crisis during which there is rapid change in political and 
institutional arrangements.162 The literature on critical junctures varies 
 
 160. Bruce Ackerman’s “constitutional moments”—the Founding, Reconstruction, and the 
New Deal—stand as good examples of such punctuations: points in time when the law has 
undergone rapid and significant change, leading to a fundamental shift in the path of the law. 
See id.  
 161. Although the majority of the work focusing on critical junctures does not draw explicit 
comparisons to the biological literature, Stephen Krasner has pointed out that the model 
nonetheless bears striking resemblance to the punctuated equilibria model of biological 
change. Institutions are characterized by periods of stability that are periodically “punctuated” 
by periods of rapid change—critical historical junctures—after which a new set of arrangements 
set in that govern a new period of stability. In Krasner’s account, the causes of the periods of 
rapid change are exogenous, emanating from changes in the external environment. Like 
biological entities, historically evolved institutions are “sticky”—they tend to resist change until 
an external crisis requires it. And as in the biological model of punctuated equilibiria, in which 
future evolutionary developments are constrained by the gene pool produced by periods of 
rapid adaptation, the solution chosen or path taken during the state-building crisis or critical 
juncture “canalizes future developments.” Krasner, supra note 45, at 223, 240. 
 162. See, e.g., RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER,  SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: 
CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 27-39 
(1991) (reviewing the critical junctures framework); Jacob S. Hacker, The Historical Logic of 
National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. 
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greatly, but the works in this vein all share the view of institutional change as 
occurring in a burst (a critical juncture) followed by a period of relative 
stability. New arrangements achieved during the critical juncture shapes the 
period of stability that follows in important ways. Each critical juncture, in 
other words, produces a distinct legacy that remains largely intact until the 
next critical juncture breaks down and reshapes the political and 
institutional arrangements anew.163 
The environment and, to some extent, chance mutations shape periods 
of change in biological evolution. Volitional action plays no role in 
determining the direction of the change that occurs during these 
punctuations. In political, institutional, and legal evolution, however, 
conscious human agency shapes the periods of change. Of course, history 
constrains the range of options even during these periods of relative 
freedom. In the legal context, for example, existing rules shape litigants’ 
arguments and the law as it has evolved shapes the issues presented by a 
case. Therefore, higher courts may be reluctant to stray far from the rules 
constructed by lower courts despite their freedom to do so. Nonetheless, 
there remains a wider array of options and a greater degree of freedom to 
shape the options selected than in the biological context. 
Despite these substantial differences between the biological and legal 
context, the biological model of stasis punctuated by periods of rapid 
change provides useful lens on the process of legal evolution in a common 
law system. It indicates the central importance of the brief but crucial 
punctuations that open up windows of opportunity for sweeping change. 
Unlike biological evolution, these windows offer opportunities for human 
agency to shape the legacy that will follow. Once the windows close, 
however, a new period of stasis settles in, making significant change 
extremely difficult. If the opportunities for significant change in law occur 
 
Medical Policy, 12 STUD.  AM.  POL.  DEV. 57, 77-80 (1998) (providing a brief overview of the 
critical junctures model); Krasner, supra note 45, at 240-44 (reviewing and summarizing critical 
junctures literature and drawing analogies between it and the punctuated equilibrium 
paradigm); Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics 29-37 (1998) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reviewing political science literature that 
engages in historical institutional analyses of critical junctures). The term “critical junctures” 
was first used in this context in Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party 
Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction, in PARTY SYSTEM AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS: CROSS-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 37 (Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan eds., 1967). 
 163. See, e.g., COLLIER &  COLLIER, supra note 162, at 29 (discussing a framework for 
analyzing critical junctures). Also referred to by Sidney Verba and others as the “branching tree 
model of sequential development,” the critical junctures approach suggests that the choice 
made during a juncture forecloses other options because vested interests arise around the 
solution chosen and operate to defend and maintain it until a new crisis once again opens the 
door to substantial change. Sidney Verba, Sequences and Development, in CRISES AND SEQUENCES IN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 283, 308 (1971); see also Krasner, supra note 45, at 240. As in other 
models of path dependence, “[p]ast choices preclude certain strategies and make them very 
costly.” Id. 
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only in certain specified circumstances, such as when an issue is appealed for 
the first time to a higher court or when a novel legal issue is raised in court, 
then advocates of legal change will be most effective in achieving their goals 
if they focus their energies on these circumstances. Moreover, in law, 
perhaps more than in any other sphere in which the model of punctuated 
equilibrium is apparent, participants in the system can use their 
understanding of this model of change to incite “punctuations.” Participants 
can create opportunities for significant change by, for example, raising a 
new legal issue or appealing an issue to a higher court. Indeed, it is also 
possible for participants to prevent such periods of rapid change from 
occurring by, for example, settling out of court.164 
The claim that significant change is only possible during punctuations 
does not imply that the law remains entirely static during periods of stasis. As 
in the biological model, the periods between punctuations are characterized 
by gradual change. In biological reproduction, each new generation 
possesses some new combination of characteristics that is different from 
previous generations. This is perhaps even more true in law: Each new 
generation of cases presents a new set of facts and circumstances to which an 
earlier-developed legal rule must be applied. Because the facts of the new 
cases are always different in some respects from those of the cases that 
preceded them, the rule must always be expanded or modified in order for 
the cases to be resolved. 
One final example illustrates many of the characteristics of evolutionary 
path dependence in the law. The process of path-dependent evolution in 
the law is evident in the development of the “inherently dangerous” rule, 
which Dean Levi and many others have used to illustrate the movement of 
legal concepts in case law over time.165 The “inherently dangerous” rule has 
 
 164. The famous Piscataway case is a good example of this. The Supreme Court dismissed 
certiorari in the much-anticipated affirmative action case, Piscataway Township Board of Education 
v. Taxman, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997), after a coalition of leading civil rights groups not directly 
involved in the case but concerned about a Supreme Court decision on affirmative action 
agreed to provide the major share of a $433,500 settlement payment to the plaintiff in the case. 
See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted  sub nom. Piscataway 
Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 512 U.S. 1117 (1997), and cert. dismissed , 522 U.S. 1010 
(1997) (holding that defendants’ affirmative action policy violates Title VII because it does not 
have a purpose equivalent to that of Title VII and because it unnecessarily burdens non -
minority interests); Linda Greenhouse, Settlement Ends High Court Case on Preferences: Tactical 
Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A6  (discussing Taxman and the settlement that ensued). 
 165. See E. Levi, Introduction, supra note 95, at 507 & n.12 (discussing the breakdown of the 
“inherently dangerous” rule). Indeed, Levi’s three theorized stages of development of legal 
concepts match the critical junctures framework almost perfectly. He explains: 
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are 
compared. . . . The second stage is the period when the concept is more or less 
fixed, although reasoning by example continues to classify items inside and out of 
the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the concept, as reasoning by 
example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the suggestive influence of 
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its origins in the case of Dixon v. Bell,166 which represents a punctuation in 
the case law. In Dixon, the court held the owner of a gun liable for the 
accidental shooting of the plaintiff’s son by a servant girl whom the owner 
had sent to fetch the gun. The judge in the case described the gun as “left in 
a state capable of doing mischief,” thus establishing the new legal principle 
that owners could be held liable for harm done by commodities due to a 
lack of care.167 From this introduction, courts gradually expanded the 
“inherently dangerous” rule to give it force far outside its original 
application. The principle first articulated in Dixon became encapsulated in 
a doctrine, announced in Longmeid v. Holliday,168 that permitted recovery 
when harm was caused by “things in their nature dangerous,” but not when 
harm was caused “by an unknown latent defect,” such as a defective lamp.169 
The case law then settled into what Levi characterizes as the “second 
stage” of development in a legal rule, during which “the concept is more or 
less fixed, although reasoning by example continues to classify items inside 
and out of the concept.”170 This period of stasis is characterized by the 
unquestioned application of the legal rule announced in Longmeid. 
Although the case law remained consistent with the original insights of Dixon 
and the legal concept it spawned, it was far from static. Courts necessarily 
applied the rule to new and unforeseen circumstances. 
The case law then entered the final stage of development—a new 
punctuation, during which the legal concept broke down, “as reasoning by 
example . . . moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the suggestive 
influence of the word is no longer desired.”171 This period began with a new 
seminal case, MacPherson v. Buick,172 in which the New York Court of Appeals 
found the Buick Motor Company liable for injuries caused by a defective 
wheel. In its holding, the court broke down the distinction between things 
“inherently dangerous” and those “latently dangerous,” and, in doing so, 
“renamed and enlarged the danger category” and “brought the law into line 
with ‘social considerations.’”173 This new punctuation thus set the stage for a 
new cycle of legal evolution. 
C. SEQUENCING PATH DEPENDENCE 
The important additional insight offered by applying sequencing path 
 
the word is no longer desired. 
Id. at 506. 
 166. 5 Maule & Selwyn 198 (1816), cited in E. Levi, Introduction, supra note 95, at 507 & n.14. 
 167. E. Levi, Introduction, supra note 95, at 508 (citation omitted). 
 168. 115 Eng. Rep. 752 (1851). 
 169. E. Levi, Introduction, supra note 95, at 510. 
 170. Id. at 506. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 173. E. Levi, Introduction, supra note 95, at 517. 
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dependence to the courts is simple yet arresting: The order in which cases 
are presented to the courts will have a significant influence on the legal rule 
selected.174 This influence will be greater if judges do not engage in 
sophisticated voting175—that is, looking forward and reasoning backward 
from the ultimate result to determine the best course of action at each 
juncture. Yet it will still exist if they do. Even if judges are able to act as 
sophisticated voters, game theory and social choice theory tell us that the 
agenda will nonetheless influence the outcome. Although a result outside 
the Condorcet set cannot be achieved under a system of sophisticated 
voting, the agenda will still influence which point within the Condorcet set is 
selected. 
Repeated cycling, of course, is unlikely to occur in a legal system that 
relies upon precedent. Where group preferences are intransitive, stare 
decisis will advantage the status quo, thereby retarding a cycle that might 
otherwise occur. This is an important distinction between political and legal 
decision making: The rule of stare decisis that applies in a common law 
system reduces the likelihood that a voting cycle will occur.176 
A simple hypothetical example helps illustrate these points. Imagine 
that there is a group of civil rights activists who wish to move from a standard 
of rational basis scrutiny for gender discrimination to strict scrutiny. Assume 
three kinds of judges (and assume equal numbers of judges in each 
category): (I) activists who prefer strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny, and 
intermediate scrutiny to rational basis; (II) cautious reformers who prefer 
intermediate scrutiny to rational basis, but feel that a move to strict scrutiny 
would be too radical a change and thus prefer the existing rational basis 
standard to strict scrutiny; (III) conservatives who prefer the existing 
rational basis standard to the other alternatives, but who prefer strict 
 
 174. I am interested here in one particular application of game theory to the common law, 
which I term sequential path dependence. The multitude of other applications of game theory 
to the legal process are beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, even when discussing the 
phenomenon of agenda setting, I have in mind only the question of the order in which a court 
considers cases. I do not, for instance, include here any analysis or discussion of the possible 
manipulation of the agenda by judges to influence the outcome of particular cases once they 
arrive on a court’s docket. This and other inquiries suggested by game theory are outside the 
scope of this Article. Notably, Judge Easterbrook has likewise observed the applicability of social 
choice theory to the common law system, though he has limited his observations to the 
Supreme Court context. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 102. See also Maxwell L. Stearns, 
Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1318 (1995) 
(outlining “the evolution of modern standing and provid[ing] a functional analysis of that 
doctrine based upon social choice theory”). 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84 (explaining that sophisticated voting 
precludes an outcome that falls outside the Condorcet set).  
 176. Of course, political institutions embody other rules and procedures, such as 
supermajority requirements and committees with exclusive jurisdiction, that also serve to retard 
cycling. See KEITH KREIHBEL,  INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 27-28 (1991) 
(summarizing “new institutional” literature proposing solutions to the cycling or “chaos” 
problem embodied in political instit utions). 
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scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny because they oppose the creation of a new 
standard of intermediate scrutiny. Civil rights lawyers can bring two cases in 
succession. They would like to achieve strict scrutiny. If they can guess the 
preferences of the court members, clearly they will not seek strict scrutiny in 
the first case. Instead, they will first seek intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate 
scrutiny will prevail over the rational basis standard (with type I and type II 
judges voting in its favor and type III judges voting against). The litigants will 
then bring a case seeking strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny will prevail over the 
intermediate scrutiny standard (with type I and type III judges voting in its 
favor and type II judges voting against). In this example, the order in which 
the cases are brought determines the outcome. Moreover, note that the 
introduction of the intermediate scrutiny option also alters the outcome. 
Were the court faced with a simple choice between strict scrutiny and 
rational basis, rational basis would prevail.177 
The insight that the order in which a case arrives at a court may 
determine its outcome focuses attention on the agenda with which a court is 
presented. For the most part, courts have little control over which cases 
appear before them and in what order. To the extent, then, that outcomes 
depend on the ordering of cases, there is room for strategic manipulation of 
courts’ agendas to obtain desired outcomes. 
The conclusion that the agenda—the order in which decisions are 
made—in a common law system can influence the outcome of a case, or, 
indeed, a line of cases, has different implications for different courts. Who 
holds the agenda-setting power depends directly on the extent of a court’s 
farsightedness and control over its docket. Courts that possess discretionary 
jurisdiction, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court and many state supreme 
courts, are better able to control the order in which they consider pressing 
legal issues. Yet even the U.S. Supreme Court, which possesses almost 
singular control over its docket, has little power over which cases appear in 
the pool of cases considered for review.178 In general, appellate courts 
possess greater foresight than trial courts in identifying cases that may come 
before them because they can observe cases in the trial courts that may 
eventually work their way onto their dockets. Trial courts do not have this 
luxury and are therefore rarely able to predict what cases may be presented. 
The element of agency in the selection of cases introduces interesting 
 
 177. This scenario violates one of the fairness conditions of Arrow’s theorem known as the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives: “a property of a social choice function such that, if two 
preference profiles are identical with respect to some subset of alternatives, then the social 
choice from each profile is the same from that subset.” RIKER, supra note 61, at 294-95. Of 
course, that is precisely the point of Arrow’s theorem: “no method of amalgamating individual 
judgments can simultaneously satisfy some reasonable conditions of fairness on the method and 
a conclusion of logicality on the result.” Id. at 116. 
 178. Occasionally, a Justice may encourage an appeal of a particular issue to the Court by 
suggesting in a dissent from denial of certiorari or in an opinion that a particular issue is ripe 
for review. PERRY, supra note 108, at 212-15. 
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wrinkles into the examination of sequencing path dependence. What power 
litigants lose in determining the order in which issues are presented to a 
court, the court itself gains. And some members of a court may gain more 
than others. At the U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist circulates what is called the “discuss list”—a list of cases that he 
deems potentially “certworthy”—in advance of every conference at which the 
Justices consider certiorari petitions.179 Although any Justice may add a case 
to the discuss list with a simple request, the Chief Justice’s power to set the 
initial agenda still influences the outcome. It allows the Chief Justice to 
suggest a set of certworthy cases and thus create a presumption that cases 
not on the list are not worthy of the Court’s consideration. Moreover, it is 
likely that a Justice who adds a case to the discuss list feels compelled to 
argue in favor of granting certiorari for the case, thus leading Justices only to 
add cases in which they are willing to actively advocate granting certiorari. 
Indeed, each Justice takes responsibility for leading the discussion at 
conference (if there is any) for any case that he or she places on the discuss 
list.180 Because no Justice is likely to take on this responsibility lightly, the 
Chief Justice’s power to issue the initial discuss list places a great deal of the 
agenda-setting power in his hands. 
In addition, the Chief Justice obtains some additional agenda-setting 
power through the Supreme Court Conference, at which the Justices discuss 
their views and take initial votes on recently argued cases. At the 
Conference, the Justices present their views on each case in order of 
seniority, beginning with the Chief Justice.181 As the first speaker, the Chief 
Justice is able to frame the discussion that follows. The Chief Justice thus has 
the power to add alternatives for the other Justices to consider (for example, 
by raising the possibility of dismissing a case as improvidently granted or 
putting forward a jurisdictional concern) and may thereby alter the holding 
of the case, much as adding the option of intermediate scrutiny altered the 
outcome of the hypothetical example above. 
The central insight offered by sequencing path dependence—that the 
ordering of cases can influence outcomes—is related, but not identical, to 
the claim of increasing returns path dependence theory that the common 
law exhibits nonergodicity. As was discussed above, a consequence of the 
common law’s increasing returns path dependence is that the early cases to 
raise a legal issue will have dramatic influence over future decisions. 
Moreover, small statements in early opinions may be broadened and 
magnified over time, gaining importance and influence as they grow. 
Sequencing theory further refines these insights into how the path-
dependent nature of the common law can influence outcomes. Not only do 
 
 179. See id. at 85-89 (describing the discuss list procedure). 
 180. Id. at 86. 
 181. Id. at 43-44. 
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small, early events have increasing effect over time, but the order in which 
the alternatives are presented may have profound influence on the ultimate 
outcome. 
This is a phenomenon that experienced litigators have long 
understood, even if they have not had a label or a clear explanation for it. 
This understanding is evident in their efforts to construct lines of case law 
that lead the courts down a path toward the desired result. Perhaps the most 
well-known and celebrated example of this is Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 
careful effort during his years litigating on behalf of the NAACP to erode 
the “separate but equal” rule of Plessy v. Ferguson .182 Justice Marshall and his 
colleagues, knowing that the Supreme Court would be extremely reluctant 
to declare the “separate but equal” rule unconstitutional, executed a series 
of well-planned steps designed to lead the Court gradually in that direction. 
They determined that the key to ending legal segregation was to challenge 
three aspects of segregated education: “that state law required separate 
schools, that expenditures were unequal, and that there were no 
mechanisms under state law to make expenditures equal.”183 But rather than 
challenge the segregation of all public education immediately, they decided 
to begin the sequence of cases with a challenge to segregation by a law 
school,184 where they believed their chance of success in court was 
greatest.185 They gradually built on their early successes, eventually setting 
the stage for the revolutionary case of Brown v. Board of Education .186 Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg adopted a similar strategy in her efforts to increase the 
Court’s standard of scrutiny in gender discrimination cases. She engaged in 
a meticulously calculated case sequence including Reed v. Reed ,187 Frontiero v. 
 
 182. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 183. MARK V. TUSHNET,  MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:  THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 12-13 (1994). 
 184. See generally McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (prohibiting the 
University of Oklahoma from requiring a black graduate student to sit physically separated in 
the classroom, to use separate tables outside the library, and to eat at separate times in the 
school cafeteria); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring admission of qualified black 
students to the University of Texas Law School); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) 
(requiring Oklahoma to provide an equal law school education to a woman denied admission 
to the University of Oklahoma because she was black); Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 
337 (1938) (ordering the State of Missouri to either admit blacks to the existing white law 
school or to provide an in-state law school for blacks); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936) 
(finding unconstitutional the denial of admission to Maryland Law School to a black man on 
the basis of his race). 
 185. TUSHNET, supra note 183, at 13. 
 186. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a more thorough discussion of the NAACP’s history in this 
respect, see ROGER L. GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN,  THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 
(1992); TUSHNET, supra note 183; MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTIONARY (1998). 
 187. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a state statute that designated preference to males 
over females in administering the estate of a person that dies intestate when both are in the 
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Richardson ,188 and Craig v. Boren,189 that led the Court down a path from the 
traditional rational basis test toward stricter scrutiny in gender-bias cases.190 
Of course, unlike the hypothetical example above, she was unable ultimately 
to persuade the Court to adopt the strict scrutiny standard. 
In these examples, the effects of increasing returns and sequencing 
path dependence are interwoven. Increasing returns path dependence helps 
explain why Justices Marshall and Ginsburg formed litigation strategies that 
 
same entitlement class). Justice Ginsburg used the principle of equal protection normally 
reserved for race discrimination cases to argue for the application of heightened scrutiny in 
gender discrimination cases. The Court did not abandon its rational basis test but it held that 
the gender classification at issue, which had passed the rational basis test below, was invalid 
because “[a] classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 188. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that federal statutes requiring uniformed servicewomen 
to prove that their husbands are dependent upon them for more than half of their support in 
order to obtain “dependent” status entitling them to increased quarters, allowances and health 
benefits violates due process where uniformed servicemen did not have to make a similar 
showing in order to obtain “dependent” status for their wives). Justice Ginsburg sought to build 
on the decision in Reed by advocating a heightened standard of scrutiny for gender-based 
classifications. A plurality of the Court adopted the strict scrutiny standard advocated by Justice 
Ginsburg, id. at 688, while four Justices concurring in the judgment refused to extend the test 
beyond that articulated in Reed. The remaining Justice, Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at 691 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 189. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a state statute making it illegal to sell 3.2% beer to 
males under the age of 21 while allowing the sale of beer to females over the age of 18 violates 
the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution). Justice Ginsburg, relying on Reed and 
Frontiero, advocated a new standard for gender classification —“intermediate scrutiny”—which 
the Court adopted. 
 190. See generally Joyce Ann Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment, 
26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (examining Justice Ginsburg’s votes during her first term on the 
Supreme Court); Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the 
Law, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 335 (1992) (detailing Justice Ginsburg’s work as a litigator that 
strategically, in a series of incremental steps, moved the Court’s analysis of sex discrimination 
from rational basis to intermediate scrutiny); Carol Pressman, The House That Ruth Built: Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and Justice, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.  RTS. 311 (1997) (examining 
Justice Ginsburg’s impact on sex discrimination law); Scott M. Smiler, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and the Virginia Military Institute: A Culmination of Strategic Success, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 541 
(1998) (describing Justice Ginsburg’s efforts, as a litigator and from the bench, to persuade the 
Court to move closer to a strict scrutiny test for gender-related discrimination); Sheila M. Smith, 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and  Sexual Harassment Law: Will the Second Female Supreme Court Justice 
Become the Court’s First Women’s Rights Champion?, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1893 (1995) (analyzing 
Justice Ginsburg’s work as a litigator in sex discrimination cases and considering how her 
presence on the Supreme Court could affect sexual harassment law). After Frontiero, but before 
Craig, Justice Ginsburg litigated Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), yet another gender 
discrimination case. Justice Ginsburg became involved in the case, which she believed to be a 
poor one, in an effort to minimize the damage that the case (which had be en filed by a local 
ACLU affiliate) might do to her efforts to lead the Court to a heightened standard of review. 
Although she lost the case, she succeeded in persuading the Court not to overrule the path of 
precedents she had carefully constructed. See Markowitz, supra, at 346-48. 
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sought to move the Court in incremental steps toward their desired goals. 
Sequencing path dependence adds to this a recognition that they used their 
agenda-setting power to present cases in an order that maximized their 
chances of obtaining the legal standard they sought. 
This illustrates an important point with which I will conclude my 
discussion of path dependence theory’s application to the law: The three 
types of path dependence described above are not mutually exclusive or 
inconsistent with one another. Rather, the three types of path dependence 
operate in tandem in a common law legal system. While one type of path 
dependence may have greater influence in a certain area of law or at a 
particular point in time, the operation of one type does not preclude the 
operation of the others. Thus, increasing returns path dependence may 
push the development of a line of cases further in the direction already 
begun, even if it is no longer the most efficient. At the same time, the 
evolution of the same legal rule may be outpaced by changes in the 
environment. This is by no means inconsistent with the prediction that the 
order in which cases are presented affects the outcome, perhaps leading to a 
result that is not Pareto-optimal. Thus, the three types of path dependence 
are separate, but overlapping, facets of the process of legal change in a 
common law legal system. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF PATH DEPENDENCE THEORY FOR THE DOCTRINE OF 
STARE DECISIS 
The application of path dependence theory to the common law leads, 
as this Article demonstrates, to some important insights: Legal change is 
unpredictable ex ante and nonergotic, and early outcomes may become 
locked in. The law evolves gradually over time, drawing on an existing stock 
of precedent, punctuated by periods of rapid adaptation. And ultimate legal 
outcomes depend significantly on the order in which decisions are made. 
These insights lead to several conclusions: The lessons for litigants, 
particularly those seeking broad legal change, are clear. Opportunities for 
obtaining significant legal change are limited. Litigants seeking a significant 
impact on the law should seek out (or attempt to create) punctuations, for it 
is only during punctuations that major change is possible.191 They must also 
be aware of the crucial importance of early decisions, which lock the law into 
 
 191. The conclusion that legal results are unpredictable does not in any way suggest that 
efforts to alter the path of the law are futile. Indeed, part of what makes legal outcomes 
unpredictable is the very fact that crucial moments in the path of the law are very much subject 
to influence by relatively small factors. A persuasive argument by a litigant that raises a novel 
legal issue may persuade a court to decide a case differently than it might otherwise have done; 
a carefully planned sequence of cases from a legal advocacy group may lead a court down a 
path to a result that it otherwise would not have chosen; or a legislature may intervene to 
reverse the course of the law in an area that it has previously ignored. It is precisely because 
these types of interventions are so influential in shaping the course of the law that the course of 
the law cannot be predicted in advance. 
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a distinct path from which it is difficult to diverge thereafter. And they 
should consider the sequence in which they bring legal issues to the courts 
and cultivate, when possible, a sequence of cases calculated to move the 
courts gradually in the desired direction. 
These are the clear lessons for advocates of legal change. The insights 
of path dependence theory also lead to conclusions regarding the proper 
treatment of precedent in the legal system. If the common law process as 
governed by the doctrine of stare decisis is path-dependent, and if path 
dependence can lead to outcomes that are deeply influenced, for instance, 
by small early decisions and the order in which cases are decided, then was 
Holmes correct when he argued that we should place limits on the reliance 
upon precedent?192 
Before reaching a conclusion on the proper place of stare decisis, it is 
first necessary to consider the doctrine’s many benefits. The arguments in 
favor of stare decisis fall into two broad categories: instrumental and 
intrinsic. Instrumentalists argue that the use of precedent contributes to 
greater predictability and certainty in the law.193 By creating a predictable 
set of legal rules that structure interactions, such as contracts and business 
deals, precedent also encourages beneficial reliance, allowing businesses to 
 
 192.  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it 
was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past. 
HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 187.  
 193. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Holdsworth’s English Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
285, 290 (1920) (“[I]mitation of the past, until we have a clear reason for a change, no more 
needs justification than appetite. It is a form of the inevitable to be accepted until we have a 
clear vision of what different thing we want.”); WASSERSTROM, supra note 106, at 60 (“The 
reason that undoubtedly is most often cited as constituting a justification for the doctrine of 
precedent is that its consistent application assures to the legal system a degree of certainty 
which would otherwise be impossible to attain.”); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial 
Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) (“The reason most often given for the practice of 
precedent is that it increases the predictability of judicial decisions.”); Maltz, supra note 106, at 
368 (“The most commonly heard justification for the doctrine of stare decisis rests on the need 
for certainty in the law.”); see also Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980): 
The doctrine of stare decisis imposes a severe burden on the litigant who asks us to 
disavow one of our precedents. For that doctrine not only plays an important rule 
in orderly adjudication; it also serves the broader societal interests in evenhanded, 
consistent, and predictable application of legal rules. When rights have been 
created or modified in reliance on established rules of law, the arguments against 
their change have special force. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); Manich v. S. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“The tendency to disregard precedents . . . has become so strong in this Court of 
late as . . . to shake confidence in the consistency of decision and leave courts below on an 
uncharted sea of doubt and difficulty without any confidence that what was said yesterday will 
hold good tomorrow . . . .”). 
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predict with greater certainty the legality of various business practices and 
arrangements.194 The use of precedent also contributes to judicial economy 
by permitting judges to build on the work of those who came before them, 
rather than revisit each issue independently, and by reducing the need for 
litigation.195 Moreover, respect for precedent fosters respect for the 
judiciary. It requires consistency and improves decision making by requiring 
judges to draw on a body of law that represents the collective experience 
and knowledge of judges over time.196 As a result, stare decisis helps to 
reassure the public that the courts’ decisions are not capricious, but are 
based instead on consistent and legitimate decision making.197 As Justice 
Cardozo noted, “[a]dherence to precedent must then be the rule rather 
than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed 
administration of justice in the courts.”198 
A second argument for stare decisis rests on its intrinsic value. This 
argument is characterized by two separate claims. The first is that stare 
decisis is valuable for its own sake: The past has inherent authority over and 
a direct claim upon us.199 The second, and in my view stronger, version of 
 
 194. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 106, at 66-69 (discussing reliance justification for 
precedent); Lyons, supra note 193, at 496 (arguing that increased legal certainty decreases the 
risk of business transactions); Powell, supra note 109, at 18 (indicating that consistency in court 
decisions “is especially important in cases involving property rights and commercial 
transactions”). 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09 (discussing the impact of precedent on 
judicial workloads). 
 196. See Welch v. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987) (noting 
the importance of past Court wisdom on current controversies). 
 197. See Maltz, supra note 106, at 371 (arguing that an important aim of stare decisis to limit 
the policymaking powers of the courts); Powell, supra note 109, at 18 (arguing that public 
respect for the courts is due in part to the knowledge that courts are not composed of 
“unelected judges free to write their policy views into law”). 
 198. CARDOZO, supra note 90, at 34. 
 199. This set of arguments is often referred to as “traditionalism.” As Dean Anthony T. 
Kronman wrote: 
[F]or most of the time that human beings have lived together in organized 
communities, every aspect of their communal lives—social, religious, political, and 
economic as well as legal—has to a large degree been organized on the assumption 
that the past has an inherent authority of just this kind, a sanctity that obligates us 
to respect the patterns it prescribes. The name we give this once -pervasive attitude 
is traditionalism. 
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1044 (1990). Arguments in this 
vein draw on the works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, see HEGEL: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 
(Frederick G. Weiss ed., 1974); Allan Bloom, ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN 
MIND (1987); Alasdair MacIntyre, ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,  AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL 
THEORY (1981); Stanley Hauerwas, WHY NARRATIVE:  READINGS IN NARRATIVE THEOLOGY 
(Stanley Hauerwas & L. Gregory Jones eds., 1989); and especially Edmund Burke, EDMUND 
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790), among others. Traditionalism is 
cast in opposition to the philosophical tradition exemplified by Hobbes, THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 180-82 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962) (1651) (arguing that only the dictates of 
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the intrinsic value argument is deontological: The use of precedent fosters 
justice because it encourages judges to treat like cases alike.200 This view 
implies that once a court has dealt with a situation, it is obligated to deal 
with similar situations in a similar way unless it finds adequate reason to treat 
them differently. The argument is based upon the belief that people have 
the right to be treated equally—to those in the past and future as well as to 
those in the present—and that, if two relevantly similar cases are treated 
differently, then one party has been treated unfairly. The deontological 
argument for precedent is thus simply a more specific form of a 
fundamental requirement of justice: Members of society in the same 
position should be treated equally.201 Viewed in this light, the doctrine of 
stare decisis is an appeal to a general principle of equality, a cousin of the 
Kantian principle of universalizability and the biblical Golden Rule.202 
The insights that path dependence theory provides regarding the costs 
associated with stare decisis should not lead us to ignore the doctrine’s many 
 
reason deserve respect), and the work of Holmes, HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 
187. 
  At the core of this argument, which has found its most recent and prominent advocate 
in Anthony Kronman, is the idea that humans live within a cultural tradition. This cultural 
tradition liberates human beings from the “narrow temporal constraints within which their 
ambitions would otherwise be confined, and permits them to dream and work on a scale larger 
than the limits of a single lifetime will permit.” Kronman, supra, at 1052. But culture not only 
possesses the potential for accumulation, it is also highly vulnerable to destruction and ruin and 
therefore must be actively maintained in order to continue to exist. Id. at 1054. These 
characteristics are unique to culture, and culture is unique to humanity. Id. at 1064. The 
distinctiveness of humanity, in other words, relies on our participation in the world of culture, 
which in turn owes its continuing existence to our respect for the work of past generations. 
Precedent, then, has a claim on us because the world of culture of which it is a part “makes us 
who we are.” Id. at 1066. See also GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES, supra note 89, at 198 (“[T]he 
weight attached to precedents in every department of life is closely connected with the force of 
habit, and has its roots deep in human nature . . . .”). 
 200. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,  THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1961) (arguing that this is the 
strongest rationale for the binding nature of precedent); WASSERSTROM, supra note 106, at  69-
72 (examining egalitarian justifications for precedent); Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of 
Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 90 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (“Another argument for 
following precedent is that justice requires it. Like cases must be treated alike or else someone 
is being treated unfairly; therefore, decision makers must treat the parties in the instant case 
the same as parties in earlier cases were treated.”); Karl Llewellyn, Case Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 249 (1930) (“The force of precedent in the law is heightened by an 
additional factor: that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are 
properly to be treated alike in like circumstances.”); Lyons, supra note 193, at 495 (arguing that 
“respect for precedent is required by the principle that like cases should be treated alike”). 
 201. We achieve fairness by decision making rules designed to achieve consistency across a 
range of decisions. Where the consistency is among individuals at the same time, we express this 
decisional rule as “equality.” Where the consistency among decisions takes place over time, we 
call our decisional rule “precedent.” Equality and precedent are thus, respectively, the spatial 
and temporal branches of the same larger normative principle of consistency. Schauer, supra 
note 118, at 596. 
 202. Id. 
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benefits. The theory of path dependence simply adds a new factor to the 
debate about when courts should obey or disobey precedent. The theory 
suggests that, ceteris paribus, the deference courts pay to precedent in a 
particular area of law should vary in direct proportion to the expected costs 
of path dependence. That is, courts should grant less deference to 
precedent when the costs of path dependence are likely to be high.  
This response allows courts to check some of the costs engendered by 
the path dependence of the common law system. It does not, of course, 
provide an exact guide to when and how courts should treat different types 
of precedent differently. But it does identify a factor that courts should take 
into account as they determine the degree of deference to be granted to 
prior decisions. In some instances, this use of path dependence theory 
explains and justifies distinctions in the degree that judges rely upon 
precedent in certain categories of cases, thus providing a theoretical basis 
for existing practice. The theory also supports extending some existing 
distinctions in the degree of reliance upon precedent, as well as creating 
distinctions not already present in the common law. In these cases, path 
dependence theory provides an argument for modifying existing practices in 
specific ways. 
In order to understand the proposal put forward here, it is important to 
observe the difference between a court’s decision to apply a relaxed doctrine 
of stare decisis and its decision to follow or discard a particular precedent. A 
court may decide that it is appropriate to relax the doctrine of stare decisis, 
but nonetheless conclude that a particular precedent should be followed 
either because it is correct or because it is not clearly incorrect. Conversely, a 
court may decide that it should not relax the doctrine of stare decisis and yet 
conclude that a particular precedent should be discarded because it is 
clearly incorrect. Indeed, as already discussed,203 courts in the United States 
do not consider themselves inexorably bound by their own previous 
decisions. Path dependence theory does not provide any reason to alter this 
practice. 
Finally, the proposal advocated here is not meant to capture all of the 
intricacies involved in determining when the doctrine of stare decisis should 
be closely observed and when it should not. Numerous factors may weigh in 
favor of or against the use of precedent in a particular case or class of cases. 
The argument I make here is simply that, all things being equal, when the 
costs of path dependence are high, courts should be more inclined to relax 
the doctrine of stare decisis. This conclusion necessarily ignores, for 
example, the other half of the cost-benefit calculus that can be applied to 
the doctrine of stare decisis.204 
 
 203. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing how courts are not strictly bound 
by their own precedents). 
 204. The converse of my argument in this Article is that, where the benefits of stare decisis 
HATHAWAY-CONV(3)[1]  3/28/2003 3:29 PM 
PATH DEPENDENCE IN L AW 155 
To illustrate the argument, I briefly examine three examples of 
categories of cases in which the costs of path dependence are expected to be 
relatively great and where, therefore, courts should be more willing, ceteris 
paribus, to relax the doctrine of stare decisis: cases in areas of the law in 
which there are few punctuations, cases that apply a legal rule developed 
under substantially different conditions, and cases that rely on dicta.205 
Notably, courts already grant less deference to precedent in cases that fall 
within these categories. Thus the theory of path dependence provides 
theoretical support for existing court practices as well as modifications 
thereof. 
A. CASES IN AREAS OF THE LAW IN WHICH THERE ARE FEW PUNCTUATIONS 
As described above, legal change is characterized by periods of stability 
punctuated by periods of rapid change. A legal rule gradually develops 
along a particular path until it is interrupted by the reversal of an earlier 
decision by a higher court or the enactment of a statute or a constitutional 
amendment. Such punctuations offer a brief opportunity for legal actors to 
realign legal arrangements that may gradually have grown out of sync with 
underlying societal conditions. Path dependence theory therefore predicts 
that, where punctuations occur more frequently, the system “self-corrects” 
more frequently. Consequently, the law moves in closer sync with societal 
conditions, assuming that the courts treat all types of precedent equally. By 
contrast, where punctuations occur less frequently, the law is expected to 
move further astray before such a correction occurs. 
Nothing in the doctrine of stare decisis, however, requires that all forms 
of precedent receive identical treatment from the courts. Path dependence 
theory argues in favor of differential treatment of precedents in areas of law 
in which punctuations occur less frequently. When considering cases that 
fall into these areas of the law, the courts can ensure that the law does not 
grow too far out of alignment with societal conditions by more readily 
reconsidering principles established in prior decisions. Conversely, when 
considering cases that fall into areas of law in which punctuations occur 
more regularly, the courts can provide stability by showing greater deference 
to precedents. 
Because much of path dependence theory captures existing intuitions, 
it should perhaps come as no surprise that current judicial practice already 
complies to a large extent with this prescription. Not all types of precedents 
 
are greater, deference to precedent should be correspondingly greater. For example, one could 
argue that, where there is more reliance on a particular legal rule, the benefits of stare decisis 
are greater and thus deference should be correspondingly greater. This Article is not meant to 
preclude consideration of such benefits, which a complete theory of the proper application of 
stare decisis would have to take into account. 
 205. Of course, the three categories are not exclusive; a single case may fall within more 
than one. 
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receive similar treatment from the courts. In particular, a clear distinction 
exists between the treatment of constitutional, statutory, and common law 
precedents.206  
Courts generally give less weight to precedent in the constitutional 
context, in which punctuations are infrequent.207 Indeed, there is no 
external check on judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions, save 
for constitutional amendments. Consequently, if courts proceed down a 
path of interpretation that grows increasingly undesirable, perhaps because 
of changing attitudes or changing conditions, courts are the only bodies that 
can easily modify that path. 
A strong rule of stare decisis in the constitutional law area would lock 
courts, and therefore the country, into continued adherence to a precedent 
that may be clearly inappropriate. The observation that constitutional law is 
subject to few punctuations from forces outside the courts argues in favor of 
applying a somewhat more relaxed standard of stare decisis to constitutional 
precedents. Courts, in other words, should be prepared to correct a deviant 
path of law more often in the area of constitutional law than in a context in 
which the opportunities for change occur more frequently.208 
By contrast, in the statutory context, courts consistently subject 
decisions to a much stronger standard of stare decisis because legislatures 
can provide a check on court decisions.209 If legislatures do not “approve” of 
 
 206. The following discussion owes a debt to William N. Eskridge, Jr.’s review of the 
emergence of these three standards of stare decisis. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1364-69 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s practice of overruling statutory precedents). For more on the 
differential treatment of constitutional, statutory, and common law precedents, see Maltz, supra 
note 106, at 388-93. 
 207. See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980) (“The doctrine of 
stare decisis has a more limited application when precedent rests on constitutional grounds, 
because ‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’”) (quoting Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Mitchell v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing the doctrine of stare 
decisis). In his dissent in Burnet, Justice Louis Brandeis defended the more relaxed standard of 
stare decisis that is generally applied to constitutional precedents in language that even reflects 
some of the insights of path dependence theory. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405-08 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). He observed that “in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, 
where  correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often 
overruled its prior decisions.” Id. at 406-07, 407 n.2 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing cases). 
 208. Path dependence theory thus adds a new dimension to the current debate over 
traditionalism in constitutional interpretation. Compare John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering 
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39-43 (1978) (arguing that tradition is in tension with 
democracy), with Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws , in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that the judiciary must 
not  innovate but should instead act to preserve consensuses reflected in longstanding 
tradition). 
 209. See, e.g., Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948) (indicating that a longstanding 
interpretation of a statute becomes “part of the warp and woof of the legislation,” which only 
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a court’s interpretation of a statute, they may change the operative language 
via legislation.210 Consequently, courts can rely on other actors to alter a 
path of statutory precedent that has grown undesirable—where undesirable 
 
Congress can change); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (“If only a question of 
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so 
widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionalit y of the course pursued 
has now been made clear and compels us to do so.”); Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 
687 (1880) (“After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction 
becomes . . . as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of a decision is . . . the 
same in its effect . . . as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment.”); see also 
FRANK C. NEWMAN & STANLEY S. SURREY,  LEGISLATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 653 (1955) 
(indicating that judges are often particularly reluctant to overrule statutory precedents); Note, 
The Power that Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 
B.U. L. REV. 345, 369-70 (1986) (defending presumption of validity of statutory, but not 
constit utional, precedents). 
  William N. Eskridge, Jr. points out that the strict rule of stare decisis for statutory 
precedents is often abridged. He has identified three common exceptions to what he terms the 
“super strong presumption” for statutory precedents. He demonstrates that the Supreme Court 
has regularly overruled statutory precedent when it finds that the Court’s consideration of the 
issue at hand was not thorough in the precedent (the “proceduralist exception”), where 
Congress has largely left development of the statutory scheme to the courts (the “exception for 
common law and constitutionalized statutes”), and where the precedent has not generated 
significant public or private reliance (the “reliance exception”). Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1368-
84. Other scholars, focusing on different aspects of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, posit 
somewhat different breakdowns in the rationale used by the Court for overruling precedent. 
For example, focusing on the Supreme Court’s constitutional rather than statutory 
jurisprudence, one scholar notes that the Court will freely overrule when (1) “precedents 
conflict,” (2) “conditions upon which the first decision was premised have changed,” and (3) 
“the rules chosen by the Court have proved unworkable.” Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1344, 1346 (1990) (footnotes omitted). As is clear on close examination, these 
exceptions again correspond fairly closely to the rules that would emerge from an application 
of path dependence theory. 
 210. Indeed, Justice Harlan Stone made just this argument in seeking to justify a strong 
rule of stare decisis for statutory precedents. He argued that, if Congress fails to amend a statute 
to overrule a statutory precedent or especially if it reenacts the statute without changing the 
relevant language, it signals its approval of the interpretation. See, e.g., Girouard v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 61, 70-76 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that, where Court’s statutory 
interpretation is publicized, Congress’s failure to act to overrule it creates presumption that 
Congress approves); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940) (Stone, J.) 
(refusing to revisit precedent in part because Congress had cle arly chosen not to intervene even 
though it was aware of the controversy). Indeed, the arguments for a stronger rule of precedent 
in the statutory context often rely upon the ability of the legislature to reverse erroneous 
interpretations of legislative intent. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (stating 
that the Supreme Court’s earlier decision ought not be disturbed because it turned on a 
question of statutory construction which Congress could alter at any time); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. 
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240 (1970) (same). I do not mean to suggest, 
however, that legislatures can be expected to act whenever they do not approve of a decision of 
the courts relating to issues of statutory interpretation. Indeed, there are many reasons to 
believe that legislatures will frequently remain silent even in the face of a decision of which they 
do not approve. See Maltz, supra note 106, at 388-89 (arguing that the legislative correction 
rationale is overstated). The argument here simply relies on the fact that outside actors will 
intervene more frequently in the statutory context than in the constitutional one. 
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precedent is defined as precedent that establishes a legal rule that diverges 
significantly from that which a rational, well-informed, and capable 
decisionmaker operating without the constraint of precedent would make. 
Courts are not the only possible source of punctuations in this context, and, 
hence, punctuations occur more easily and are more frequent. The courts 
thus bear less of the burden of correcting the path of the law and can err in 
the direction of protecting stability by deferring to precedent more readily 
than they might in the constitutional context. 
Finally, courts typically treat common law precedents, which consist 
entirely of judge-made law and involve no statutory or constitutional 
principle to which the courts can look, as falling somewhere between the 
two poles of constitutional and statutory precedent. In the common law 
area, courts create the law in the absence of legislative or constitutional 
direction. As in the statutory context, legislatures may correct a path that it 
perceives as undesirable. However, legislatures are usually less likely to do so 
in the common law than in the statutory context because the area is, by 
definition, one that they have previously declined to enter. Thus, while 
another actor is able to alter the path taken by the courts, it is not likely to 
do so. That is, a punctuation may, but probably will not, come from outside 
the courts. In such circumstances, an intermediate presumption in favor of 
stare decisis is entirely reasonable. 
Path dependence theory thus provides a theoretical basis for an existing 
practice. It justifies—and, indeed, argues for—differential treatment of 
constitutional, statutory, and common law precedents in an effort to balance 
the relative frequency with which punctuations occur in those areas of law. 
Seen in this light, the courts’ more deferential treatment of statutory 
precedent and less deferential treatment of constitutional precedent reflect 
an effort to provide more stability when outside actors can be expected to 
reign in an errant legal rule, but take greater responsibility for the path of 
the law when outside actors are unlikely to intervene. 
B. CASES THAT APPLY A LEGAL RULE DEVELOPED UNDER SUBSTANTIALLY 
DIFFERENT CONDITIONS 
Another category in which the costs of path dependence are likely to be 
high includes cases that apply a legal rule developed under substantially 
different conditions—where, that is, underlying conditions have changed 
markedly since the legal rule’s introduction or where the original basis of 
the rule has since been revealed to be flawed. In these cases, path 
dependence theory argues in favor of greater relaxation of stare decisis, all 
other things being equal. 
As has been discussed at length, path dependence theory suggests that 
stare decisis can lead to the maintenance of a legal principle that is outdated 
and inefficient. Over time, as a legal principle becomes more and more 
entrenched, its failure to respond to changes in underlying conditions can 
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result in increasing inefficiency. For a variety of reasons, other actors may be 
ignorant of the growing inefficiency and therefore unlikely to act to change 
it. Alternatively, they may be aware of it but reluctant or unable to correct it. 
In such circumstances, path dependence theory would argue in favor of 
permitting the courts to relax the doctrine of stare decisis.211 The 
application of path dependence theory to the common law system thus leads 
to the conclusion that, ceteris paribus , the courts should reconsider staunch 
adherence to precedent when conditions have changed significantly, 
undermining the basis of the challenged precedent, or where the 
experience of time has made clear—in a way that it could not have been at 
the time the decision was made—that the precedent was “wrong” from the 
start. 
The string of cases involving preemption of state statutes and common 
law by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
illustrates the costs that may result from adherence to stare decisis when 
underlying conditions change.212 ERISA’s preemption clause provides that 
state laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans shall be “superseded” by 
the Act unless the laws are preserved by one of the savings provisions of 
Section 514(b) of the Act. 213 The first case presented to the Supreme Court 
regarding this clause involved the regulation of pension plans, which were 
the main focus of the Act.214 In this context, the Court interpreted ERISA’s 
ambiguous preemption language to permit employee benefit plan sponsors 
to evade state regulation by self-insuring, rather than purchasing insurance. 
This approach was not problematic in the pension area because ERISA 
comprehensively regulates pension plans, filling the gap left by the 
preempted state regulations.215 
 
 211. This proposal is similar to Eskridge’s proposed commonsense “evolutive” approach to 
statutory precedent. Under the evolutive approach, a statutory precedent is more likely to be 
overruled if its reasoning has been exposed as problematic and its results pernicious, and it has 
not induced significant public and private reliance. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1385 
(outlining the evolutive approach). The approach counsels the Court to consider three issues 
when it decides whether to reconsider a precedent: (1) With the benefit of hindsight, was the 
precedent wrongly decided? (2) Is it pernicious, detracting from national policies? (3) Do these 
problems outweigh the costs imposed on those who have acted in reliance on the decision? Id. 
at 1388. These three inquiries are designed to determine the extent to which the precedent has 
become obsolete. 
 212. I am indebted to Jacob Hacker for suggesting this example. 
 213. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
 214. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1981) (holding that 
ERISA preempted a New Jersey workers’ compensation law prohibiting pension plan provisions 
that deducted workers’ compensation benefits from pension benefits and deciding that ERISA 
preemption is broader than ordinary federal preemption, which displaces only laws inconsistent 
with provisions or goals of federal law or in areas that federal law regulates). 
 215. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?: A Case 
Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS . 35, 68-69 (1996) (noting that the 
Supreme Court rejected two limits on preemption). 
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Over time, however, the Court’s broad interpretation of the preemption 
language had the apparently unintended effect of creating regulatory voids 
in areas not substantively addressed in any depth by ERISA.216 This was 
perhaps most pronounced in the area of health finance. In response to the 
distinction created by the Court between insured and self-insured health 
plans, increasing numbers of employers self-insured to take advantage of 
ERISA’s preemption of state regulation.217 This, in turn, led to a “significant 
but unintended shift in the structuring and financing of health plans”218 and 
created a regulatory void in the area of health insurance. This occurred 
because, although ERISA preempts state laws on the topic, it does not 
provide any regulation in their place. 219 At the same time, more stringent 
cost control practices by health plans gave rise to more frequent, intense, 
and consequential legal conflicts between medical insurers and patients 
seeking care.220 The conditions underlying the original decision thus have 
changed substantially since the Court first interpreted the ERISA 
preemption language, leading to a result unintended by the Court or by the 
Act’s authors.221 Moreover, the legislature has proven unable or unwilling to 
respond to the problem because such a large constellation of private 
interests—most notably private health insurance companies—have arisen 
around the existing system.222 In such circumstances, I argue, it is 
appropriate for the courts to relax the doctrine of stare decisis and to 
reconsider the issue with a more critical eye toward precedents leading 
further down a path that began under entirely different circumstances. 
The claim that changes in underlying conditions should cause courts to 
reconsider prior precedent is, of course, by no means entirely new. Even 
 
 216. Indeed, employers have even relied on the Court’s interpretation of ERISA to 
challenge state laws that simply mention ERISA plans. Id. at 65-66. 
 217. See id . at 67-68 (discussing the state insurance law exception ). 
 218. Id. at 68. 
 219. Cases involving ERISA preemption of state health regulations include Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (finding that ERISA preempted state disability and human rights 
laws that prohibited discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and required employers to 
provide sick leave to employees disabled by pregnancy); and Arcudi v. Stone & Webster 
Engineering Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983) (affirming summarily a case invalidating a state statute 
that required employers to continue health, accident, and life insurance coverage for their 
employees while they received workers’ compensation benefits). 
 220. See Robert Pear, Hands Tied, Judges Rue Law that Limits H.M.O. Liability, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 1998, at A1. 
 221. Congress intended to encourage employers to provide benefits to workers by 
establishing uniform federal standards for pension and health plans so that insurers would not 
have to comply with a multitude of conflicting state laws and regulations. Id. 
 222. This, of course, suggests that lock-in in the legal system is not just a result of stare 
decisis, but of lock-in effects in the lawmaking process as well. See Pierson, Increasing Returns, 
supra note 14, at 37-47 (describing the path dependence of the policymaking process). An 
interesting avenue of future research would be to examine the interplay between the path-
dependent processes in the three political branches. 
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Justice Cardozo, a staunch advocate of the doctrine of stare decisis, 
conceded that “when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has 
been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social 
welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full 
abandonment.”223 He went on to advocate that “[t]here should be greater 
readiness to abandon an untenable position . . . particularly when in its 
origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a 
new significance or development with the progress of the years.”224 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that changes in underlying conditions 
can lead a court to reconsider the validity of a prior precedent. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,225 for example, the Court explained that in determining 
whether to overrule a prior case, courts consider “whether facts have so 
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of 
significant application or justification.”226 
Of course, the simple observation that courts should be more willing to 
relax the doctrine of stare decisis when underlying conditions have changed 
begs the difficult question of what types of changes qualify. As with any legal 
rule, the prescription is not absolute: Judges must use discretion when 
putting rules into effect. But path dependence theory can provide some 
specific guidance in answering the question of when judges should apply a 
relaxed standard. It suggests that, before applying a relaxed standard of 
stare decisis, judges should identify some clear, relevant, underlying changes 
that have undermined the precedent. The changes must undermine the 
central basis of the original decision. Changes in peripheral or minor details 
are not sufficient. Indeed, if the conditions underlying the central basis for 
the original precedent remain unchanged, and a judge simply disagrees with 
a decision, the judge should nonetheless follow the precedent—unless, of 
course, there is another basis in law for doing otherwise.227 
 
 223. CARDOZO, supra note 90, at 150. 
 224. Id. at 151. He also noted that: 
“That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules which grew up in a 
remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another 
generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule 
of law represents what should be according to the established an settled judgment 
of society, and no considerable property rights have become vested in reliance 
upon the old rule.” 
Id. at 151 (citation omitted). 
 225. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 226. Id. at 855. 
 227. As noted above, the doctrine of stare decisis does not bind a court to follow its own 
precedent where it finds it to be fundamentally incorrect. Thus, a judge may apply the doctrine 
of stare decisis and yet come to the conclusion that a decision is wrong and must be reversed. I 
do not intend to imply here that this practice should be changed in any way. Rather, I simply 
mean to argue that the theory of path dependence supports a relaxation of the doctrine of stare 
decisis only in certain specific circumstances. 
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Path dependence theory thus lends a theoretical underpinning to a 
pragmatic consideration applied occasionally by the courts.228 In fact, it not 
only provides a rationale for an occasional practice, but it also argues for a 
more systematic and regular application of the practice. Moreover, it 
provides more specific guidance for when courts should and should not base 
a decision to relax the doctrine of stare decisis on changes in social 
conditions by requiring a focus on the centrality of those changes to the 
basis for the original decision. 
C. CASES THAT RELY ON DICTA 
A third category of cases in which the costs of stare decisis are high are 
cases that rely on dicta—statements unnecessary to the decision in a 
preceding case. As I have argued, because of the nonergodicity of the 
American common law system, small, early statements can have large effects 
over time.229 When those statements are not well considered or address 
issues that have not been thoroughly briefed, the chances increase that the 
nonergodicity of the common law will lead to negative effects.230 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this observation. The first is that 
courts should be reluctant to defer to dicta in previous decisions. To some 
extent, of course, this recommendation reflects current practice. Courts 
often refuse to rely on previous decisions cited for propositions made in 
dicta. However, the admonition to avoid reliance on dicta is also frequently 
broken. Courts regularly cite propositions in prior decisions that are of 
questionable importance to the earlier decisions. The observation that such 
practices introduce significant costs encourages greater reluctance to rely on 
such statements. As Roscoe Pound once observed, 
It is not stare decisis that the law reformer should be assailing . . . . 
What needs rectification is a judicial habit of following language 
extracted from its setting by text writers, of adherence to formulas 
instead of to the principle of decisions, and the taking of the words 
for law rather than the judicial action which those words sought to 
explain.231 
A second conclusion is that judges should not write opinions that stray 
from their central issues. This supports a practice that might be termed 
judicial restraint or judicial minimalism: a policy of deciding only those 
 
 228. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its 
judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations 
designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, 
and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”). 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 121-26. 
 230. It is, of course, possible that there will be dicta that is both well-briefed and well-
considered. This argument does not apply with the same force in such circumstances. 
 231. Pound, supra note 5, at 13. 
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issues that are central to the instant case and avoiding issues that are not.232 
Including extraneous statements in an opinion invites later reliance on 
those statements and thus multiplies the costs of a nonergodic common law 
system. If a judge writes an opinion that decides issues or includes 
statements that are not directly relevant to the issues raised in the case, those 
statements may or may not be carefully examined by other members of the 
court and therefore pose a higher risk of error. Moreover, the statements 
may later form the basis for rulings by the same or a lower court on the issue 
unnecessarily addressed, thus multiplying the impact of an original error. In 
this way, possibly ill-considered statements may gain greater influence over 
time. For this reason, judges should be discouraged from intentionally or 
unintentionally storing “nuts to be pulled out at some later time.”233 
The theory of path dependence thus provides support for stricter 
adherence to an existing principle of law: Courts should rely only on those 
statements in previous opinions that are necessary to the decision and 
should avoid reliance on dicta. Moreover, it argues in favor of the somewhat 
more controversial practice of judicial minimalism, in the sense that it 
counsels judges to include in an opinion no more than what is necessary to 
decide the case at hand thoroughly and completely. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of stare decisis that is central to our common law system 
creates an explicitly path-dependent process. The past forms the point of 
departure for the present. The present, in turn, forms the point of 
departure for the future. Therefore, the historical path leading to each new 
outcome or decision directly shapes that outcome in specific and systematic 
ways. Oliver Wendell Holmes was thus correct when he said that 
understanding the history of the law is central to understanding the law as it 
is today. 
By applying the three strands of path dependence drawn from the 
social and natural sciences, we learn a great deal about the specific ways in 
which history shapes and constrains the legal process. We learn that small 
early events have a significant impact on outcomes, the doctrine of stare 
 
 232. The judicial minimalism supported by path dependence theory is subtly different from 
the judicial minimalism advocated by Cass Sunstein. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1999) (arguing in favor of “saying no more 
than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided”). The judicial 
minimalism advocated here, by contrast, entails not straying in an opinion from issues that are 
central to the case. This does not necessarily require leaving as much as possible undecided; 
rather, it simply requires not including statements that are extraneous to the issue presented. In 
other words, while Sunstein’s minimalism argues against statements that are central to the issue 
at hand but that may have a broader impact than on the specific issue presented, the 
minimalism argued for here would permit such statements as long as they are directly relevant 
to the issue presented. 
 233. MURPHY, supra note 121, at 203. 
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decisis locks in legal rules, and outcomes are difficult to predict. In addition, 
we better understand that legal rules evolve gradually over time but that this 
gradual evolution is regularly punctuated by significant shifts in the legal 
environment. These opportunities for significant change are brief and 
intermittent, and the new arrangements that emerge out of them 
significantly shape and constrain future developments in the law. 
Furthermore, we now understand that the order in which cases are 
presented to the courts can have a significant impact on the legal rules that 
emerge. Finally, we understand that path dependence can lead to growing 
inefficiency over time, as rules are unable to change with the underlying 
social conditions that they govern. 
Applying path dependence theory to the law thus provides new insights 
into the course and pattern of legal change in a common law system. It 
builds upon the work of scholars who have long observed the parallels 
between evolution in nature and evolution in the law, while offering a 
corrective to the evolution-to-efficiency claims that have dominated this 
scholarship in recent decades.234 Moreover, the theory of path dependence 
expands the focus of historical inquiry beyond the evolutionary model by 
identifying three separate accounts of how history influences the pattern 
and process of legal change in a common law system—increasing returns, 
evolutionary, and sequencing path dependence. And it describes the specific 
features of the legal system that are likely to bring about and reinforce these 
forms of path dependence, thus linking legal institutions and legal 
outcomes. In the process, it helps scholars and practitioners to understand 
better the sources of legal stability and change and thereby to identify, and 
even create, opportunities for significant alterations in the law.235 
The descriptive insights provided by path dependence theory also have 
normative implications. The observation that a system of law that relies upon 
 
 234. Path dependence theory demonstrates that legal outcomes are shaped not only by the 
facts and issues presented in the courtroom but also by the history of the courts’ consideration 
of similar cases. Consequently, the legal rules applied may not always be the very best, or most 
efficient, that could be constructed were courts unconstrained by history. Legal equivalents of 
the imperfect panda’s thumb or the inefficient Qwerty keyboard—evidence of the rule’s path of 
development—remain throughout the legal system. 
 235. Another important consequence —and a worthy avenue of future research—is that 
common law legal systems will likely demonstrate characteristics not found in civil law systems, 
which do not recognize the existence of a formal doctrine of stare decisis. This can help explain 
some variation in legal rules between nations with different legal systems. Of course, to the 
extent that civil law systems rely primarily on national codes, they will still exhibit path 
dependence insofar as the legislative process that produces the codes is itself influenced by path 
dependence. See sources cited supra note 45 (providing overview of literature applying path 
dependence theory to various political processes). The path dependence will simply be of a 
different form. Moreover, path dependence theory suggests that international variation in legal 
rules can be explained, at least in part, by looking to variations between countries in small early 
events and the types of and opportunities for punctuations, which play such an important role 
in the evolution of legal rules. 
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precedent is path dependent and that path dependence can lead to certain 
identifiable costs, including inefficient legal rules and dependence of 
outcomes on the order in which cases are presented, requires us to 
reexamine once again the long-accepted doctrine of stare decisis upon 
which our common law system rests. The remaining challenge is to 
determine when the newly defined costs of path dependence in the 
common law system are sufficiently significant to justify relaxing the 
doctrine of stare decisis. If we succeed, we will be left with a legal regime that 
preserves the value of stare decisis while responding to the changing 
historical currents of the complex world it governs. 
 
